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ABSTRACT 
Russian-Moldovan Relations after the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union 
Anna Napieralska 
 
 
After the break-up of the Soviet Empire a newborn Republic of Moldova faced a series 
of challenges, one of which was creating the political and economic foundations that would 
allow it to become the sustainable European country. It proved to be an extremely difficult 
task. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990’s Moldova was widely known as the poorest and the 
least economically stable country on the old continent. During the first years of independence 
the Moldovan leaders realized that the greatest challenge would be to limit Russian influences 
on the domestic and foreign policy of the country. Since the Russian Federation, the principal 
successor state of the Soviet Union, considered Moldova to be of the highest strategic 
importance it wanted to ensure that Moldova would remain under the Russian sphere of vital 
interests. Unfortunately for Moldova it also meant that Kremlin wanted it to remain 
impoverished and divided, and thus, easier to control. Support for the self-proclaimed 
Dniestrian Moldovan Republic became one of the effective tools of Moscow in pursuing its 
own vision of Kishinev’s position on the European scene.  
The current study presents the Russian foreign policy strategy toward the Republic of 
Moldova after the collapse of the Soviet Union and shows how the weak and small country 
had to struggle with outside influences on its domestic affairs. It also argues that it has been in 
Russia’s best interests to maintain the current Moldovan status quo in order to be able to 
prevent it from strengthening cooperation with Western players, particularly NATO and the 
EU.  The study examines in detail the various mechanisms of Russian foreign policy that were 
aimed at balancing the Western influences in Moldova. Finally it argues that for over the past 
twenty years the Kremlin has not hesitated to use blackmail, especially on trade issues, which 
has significantly inhibited the Moldovan process of transformation into a democratic and 
sustainable state.
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          INTRODUCTION 
 
 
For the citizens of the territories behind the Iron Curtain the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 and the changes brought by it signified the beginning of new era. Everything what 
constituted the existence of the Soviet republics suddenly disappeared: the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party, the Soviet system of state socialism, Marxist ideology and central 
planning. The dissolution of the Soviet state resulted in the creation of numerous independent 
states that had to face several challenges and difficulties which accompanied the transition.
 1
 One 
of the great examples of a post-Soviet country struggling with those difficulties is Republic of 
Moldova, which declared the independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991. The 
newborn country already at the beginning of 1990s confronted many of the challenges facing the 
ex-Soviet republics – economic decline, political turmoil, and inter-ethnic discord2. The lack of 
the political consensus between political leaders regarding economic policies, failed attempts to 
initiate structural reforms as well as a lack of qualified cadres to serve in the local administration 
had resulted in the significant deterioration of the economic situation. On the top of Moldova’s 
                                                 
1Manuel Irman, Moldovan Division after the Collapse of the USSR: Russia's Role i\n the Transitional Process of 
Moldova and its Renegade Province Transnistria ( Zurich:  GRIIN, 2010), p.6. 
2 Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition (Chisinou:  Center for Romanian Studies, 1997), p. 
16. 
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internal issues, the country had to face the challenging task of establishing relations with the 
Russian Federation. 
Russo-Moldovan relations after the breakdown of Soviet Empire became a main focus of 
foreign policy conducted by the government in Chisinau. Due to Moldova’s geopolitical position, 
even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union Moscow’s stance remained an important factor in 
the Chisinau decision-making process. Thus, Russian authorities, not surprisingly, have been 
taking advantage of that position interfering systematically in Bessarabian politics.
3
 As Ella 
Akerman rightly puts it, “Russia had neither experience nor traditions in establishing interstate 
relations with the former Union republics, and consequently did not succeed to formulate a 
positive foreign policy taking into account its national and state interests.”4  Moscow usurped the 
right to have a major influence in the region, making it “a zone of its vital interest”5. One of best 
examples of Russian politics is its military intervention in the Moldovan civil war in 1992. Thus, 
Russo-Moldovan relations after 1991 is the focus of this thesis, as an excellent example of how 
Russians understand their role in post-Soviet space as well as how the post-Soviet country 
struggles with pleasing its most important international partner.  
There are a couple of reasons for which the research on Russo-Moldovan relations is so 
important. First of all, the shape of relations between Moldova and Russia in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union reveals the real attitude of Russian Federation toward the EU and 
NATO as well as raises important questions about Russian policy toward Europe's newborn 
                                                 
3 Although historically (before the annexation by Russians) the name Bessarabia denoted the area of Moldova 
between the Prut river and Black Sea , Russian diplomacy extended the term to the entire territory between Prut and 
Dniester river. Source: Andrei Brezianu, Historical Dictionary of Republic of Moldova (Lanhaim: The Scarecrov 
Press,2001), p.20-21. 
4 Ella Akerman, Implications Of Russia's Foreign And Security Policy On Moldova, (Ardeen: Scottish Centre for 
International Security), access online 30 March 2012: 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGcQFjAH&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fleader.viitorul.org%2Fpublic%2F530%2Fen%2FImplications_Russia_policy.doc&ei=8bCZT4njO8mJ6AH
b3-zvBg&usg=AFQjCNHQzuIJCpLKxXv8Lgby9V_IqjstwA&sig2=Xb76qX2RtCOR9WIgoHH5-g 
5 Ibid.  
  3 
states. One of that main goals of the Kremlin's policy is to maintain Moldova's “political 
independence” not only from the Romania's influence but most of all, from becoming a member 
of the EU. The example of the Russian role within the Chisinau’s politics, especially concerning 
potential Moldova – EU integration, which Moscow categorically opposes, might serve as eye-
opener for those who claimed that EU – Russian relations are based on a mature partnership. 
Another factor that makes the relations between Moldova and Russia so significant is the 
fact that the Russian policy toward Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic mirrors the schematic 
policy toward other breakaway territories like Abkhazia or South Ossetia. In that sense the 
Transnistrian case serves as an excellent case study of Russian neo - imperialistic attempts to 
influence (or blackmail) the former republics of the Soviet Union. Hence, the current study will 
help to answer the question whether the foreign policy of Moscow towards Moldova is another 
instance of attempting to regain control and influence over a former Soviet colony, the expression 
of Russian inability of breaking with the Soviet past, or a “harder” version of Russian “soft 
power”. 
There is also another aspect of the Russian policy worth analyzing. Namely, the official 
attitude of the government in Moscow toward Russians who, after disintegration of Soviet Union, 
found themselves living in the newly independent states. As Russians constitute almost 10 
percent of the population of Moldova (and over 30 percent of Transnistria and Bender) their 
presence remains an important element of the Russian policy toward Chisinau. Thus the constant 
involvement of Russia into the politics of  Moldova’s independent state is often excused as the 
need to defend the interests of the Russian minority living in Moldovan territory. In the current 
study the question how in practice the Russian policy influences the coexistence of different 
ethnic groups in Moldova will be answered. 
  4 
It is also necessary to point out what kind of impact the relations between Moscow and 
Chisinau have on the economic and social situation in Bessarabia. In order to do so, this thesis is 
going to include not only the description of the different types of trade, political, cooperative, 
enterprise and custom agreements but it will also scrutinize their short and long - term impacts on 
the Moldovan society and economy. Moreover, this study will focus on the impact that Russian 
policy has had on the Moldovan political scene by analyzing economic sanctions, political 
pressures and the influence of Russian interest groups. 
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that the Republic of Moldova and its relationship 
with its neighbors seem to be completely omitted by both English and Russian - speaking 
scholars. In fact, in the English - speaking world, there are only two well-known professors, both 
from United States who are specializing in the Moldovan studies and are publishing books and 
articles on Moldovan nation - building, the current political situation and the Soviet – Romanian 
dispute over Bessarabia after World War I– Charles King and Nicholas Dima.6 The author was 
not able to find any comprehensive study on the Russia-Moldova relationship in the aftermath of 
Soviet's collapse, either in the Russian or English language. 
In order to explain all the issues mentioned above the current paper includes 
comprehensive analysis of the historical background of the relationship between the two 
countries. Although this part of the research greatly exceeds the observed period for this thesis, 
including it is necessary for couple of reasons. First, the modern history of Moldova is strictly 
related to history of the Russian Empire, since after 1812 Moldovan territory was under Russian 
rule. More than century of Russian government, which implemented a harsh policy of 
                                                 
6 e.g. Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition (Chisinou:  Center for Romanian Studies, 
1997); Charles King,  The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2001); Nicholas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian Territorial Dispute (New York: 
Colambia University Press, 1982). 
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colonialism and russification, resulted in growing antagonism between Russian authorities and 
the native inhabitants. Moreover, one can notice some similarities between the policy conducted 
by the Russian Federation and the one that was an attribute of Russian Empire at the beginning of 
twentieth century, such as a ban on Moldovan wine or import sanctions. Finally, the Soviet 
authorities, while ruling the Romanian territory of Bessarabia in accordance with Ribbentrop-
Molotov accords, in order to maintain its independence from Romania commenced the Moldovan 
nation - building process. This finally led to the creation of the independent Moldovan state and 
distinct nation in 1991 
The first chapter of this thesis presents the history of the Moldovan territory under the 
rule of the Russian Empire after 1812. It includes the basic components of Russian policy toward 
the new province, the description of the russification process and colonization of the region as 
well as the native inhabitants’ response towards it. Later, the main focus of the chapter becomes 
the interwar and the years from 1941 to 1991 when Moldavia became one of the 15 republics 
subordinated directly to the government of the Soviet Union.  The second chapter is devoted to 
analyzing the Moldova-Russia relations after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It begins with the 
description of the Moldovan civil war in the early 90's and Russian involvement in the conflict. It 
later takes under the scrutiny the numerous attempts to settle the Transnistrian conflict and the 
foreign policy strategies of both countries. Finally, the last chapter shows the changes in the 
Moldovan-Russian co-operation that were brought by XXI century. It presents how the rule of 
Moldovan communists influenced the relationship between the states as well as how the 
Moldova’s geopolitical position between East and West contributed to the political impasse in the 
country. 
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Chapter I 
Historical Background of Russian-Moldovan 
relations 
 
                       1. Introduction to the History of the region 
 
The history of Moldova from its very beginning is strictly connected with the history of 
the Romanian nation. The Romanian Principality of Moldova, inhabited mostly by Daco-
Romans, predecessors of the Romanians, came into being between the Carpathian Mountains and 
the Dniester River in the early fourteenth century and was founded by the Wallachian prince from 
Maramures. Medieval Moldova covered the so-called Carpathian – Danube – Dniester region, 
from Transylvania in the west to the Dniester River in the east. It is worth noting that  shortly 
before the emergence of the new state, the area between the Prut and Dniester rivers – the 
motherland of Moldovans -  belonged to the Wallachian dynasty Bessarab, after whom the entire 
province was named Bessarabia7. 
 
                                                 
7Nicholas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian Territorial Dispute (New York: Colambia 
University Press, 1982) p. 10. 
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Map 1 The Medieval Principality of Moldova8 
 
 
 
The Romanian inhabitants of the Principality of Moldova migrated to the area, according 
to Hungarian sources, from the northern parts of Transylvania at the beginning of first 
millennium. They unified the people already living in the territory and organized the territory into 
                                                 
8 B.a., The Medieval Principality of Moldova, CIA World Factbook, accessed online 21 September 2012, 
http://www.google.com/imgres?um=1&hl=pl&sa=N&biw=1920&bih=843&tbm=isch&tbnid=7OXWnXprRYgEmM
:&imgrefurl=http://www.answers.com/topic/moldova&docid=zbOn4D8wi2_fDM&imgurl=http://content.answcdn.c
om/main/content/img/factbook/maps/md-map.gif&w=328&h=713&ei=2-
FlUNGWHMfQsgbym4DgBA&zoom=1&iact=hc&vpx=1198&vpy=232&dur=2227&hovh=331&hovw=152&tx=8
7&ty=175&sig=112031022142017531206&page=2&tbnh=123&tbnw=56&start=56&ndsp=68&ved=1t:429,r:18,s:5
6,i:306 
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a state9. The other ethnic groups that started to settle in the region from the sixth century were 
mostly Slavs and Tatars, but they cohabited with the locals and they were absorbed fully by them 
within the first centuries of coexistence. Although by the end of the fourteenth century Moldova 
had grown in strength and quickly became an important power in southeastern Europe, its 
geographical location made it vulnerable to the attacks of the Ottoman Turks, Hungarians, and  
Poles10.The young state of Moldova for decades had to fight to defend its independence.  
Eventually, in 1512 the province agreed to pay tribute to the Ottoman Sultan and thus became a 
vassal state to the Ottoman Porte, yet it enjoyed relative autonomy within the Empire. The 
following centuries were marked by continuous struggle among the great European powers at that 
time: Austria, Turkey, and Russia – over Southeastern Europe11. During the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the Russian Empire begun to expand into southern Ukraine, dangerously 
drawing near to the Bessarabian territory.  Simultaneously, the process of disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire resulted in the dismemberment of Moldovan territory. Firstly, in 1774 the 
northwestern part of principality (Bukovina) was ceded to the Habsburg Empire and then, the rest 
of historical Moldova between the Prut and Dniester (Bessarabia) was incorporated by Russia12.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9Marcel Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule: Diplomatic History from the Archives of the 
Great Powers (New York: Algora Publishing, 2002), p.18. 
10The principality of Moldavia lied directly on the north-south trading route linking the Hanseatic states with the 
Genoese and Byzantine settlements along the Dniester River and the Black Sea. The Principality also stood at the 
center of the conflict between the Poles, Hungarians and Ottomans after the fifteenth century as often collaborating 
with foreign invaders as standing together against them. Charles King,  The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the 
Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), p.14. 
11Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…,p.11. 
12Ibid.,p.10. 
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2. The First Annexation of Bessarabia and Russian Rule, 1812 – 1918 
 
 
At the time of annexation, the Bessarabian territory - 17,350 square miles, included 
between 240, 000 and 350, 000 people, most of whom were Romanian- speaking Moldovans13. 
Due to the  unstable international position of the Empire (the war with France), the region’s great 
distance from the Russian capital and finally the poor condition of the Russian finances, in the 
first phase of Russian domination, Bessarabia was able to gain a privileged status within the 
empire.14 In the first phase of Russian domination, the unstable international position of Empire, 
the war going on with France, the territories great distance to Russian capital and finally the poor 
condition of the Russian finances resulted in granting Bessarabia a privileged status15.The 
Russian government decided to give the region certain autonomy, including the preservation of 
the Ottoman privileges and the application of traditional Moldovan laws and customs. 
Nevertheless, knowing the horrible situation in the areas earlier incorporated to Russia, tens of 
thousands Moldovan families decided to move to the western bank of the Prut River. Moreover, 
Moldovan boyars did not recognize the Russian incorporation of the area, arguing that the Turks 
could not cede the right to the Moldovan territory, as it was not a Turkish province but just a 
vassal of Turkey and that “the Sultan had no right to accept the cession of territory without their 
consent.”16 Nevertheless, owing to the intention to create an example of how Russia would treat 
the territories which had belonged to Ottomans, the new acquisition was not subjected to the 
                                                 
13Historians despute the actual number of inhabitants at the time of annexation: Nistor, Istoria 
Bessarabiei(Bucharest: Humanitast, 1991), 197.; Popovici Andrei, The political status of Bessarabia 
(Washington:Randsell, 1931),  80 ; King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politic,p.19. 
14Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20. 
15Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20. 
16King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.19. 
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same oppressive measures as other territories of the Russian Empire.17Tsar Alexander I allowed 
the Bessarabian nobles, led by Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni, to constitute a civil government and 
under the special rule established in 1818, Moldovans were given wide latitude in the local 
government, with Moldovan language serving alongside Russian as an official language of the 
local administration. 18 Autonomy was also given to the local Orthodox church which maintained 
independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. Marcel Mitrasca, a scholar of diplomatic history 
affiliated with Babes Bolyai University, claims that Russia's policy toward Bessarabia was not 
only the result of the international tensions and domestic problems of the Empire, but mainly the 
result of Tsar Alexander’s tactic  to “win over the inhabitants.”19 The Russian Tsar, while giving 
instructions to the boyars loyal to Empire, said: “The public burdens must be equally distributed: 
the honesty of the administrative officials must make the inhabitants forget the lack of a regular 
system of laws, let the inhabitants feel the advantage of the fatherly and liberal administration. 
Draw the attention of neighboring people to this province by making it happy.”20 
Yet Moldovans did not enjoy privileged treatment for long as Russian policy soon 
changed. The death of the Moldovan leader Banulescu-Bodoni in 1821 resulted in the growing 
assertiveness of the boyars which, in turn, resulted in retracting many of the privileges and rights 
given in the first years of annexation.21 The immediately deteriorating situation of the local 
nobles and the change for the worse in the economy led to the boyars’ insurrection in 1821. The 
Bessarabians did not need to wait long for the Russian response. In 1829 the autonomous 
Province of Moldova became a Russian Gubernia, which meant in practice the end of the special 
                                                 
17Bruchis, Michael, The Republic of Moldova: From the Collapse of the Soviet Empire to the Restoration of the 
Russian Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.11. 
18Nistor, Istoria Besarabiei…, p.228-231. 
19Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20. 
20Quoted in: Robert William Seton-Watson, The history of Roumanians: From Roman Times to the Completion of 
Unity (Oxford: Veda Publishing House, 1963), p.32. 
21King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.22. 
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status of the region within the Empire. Meanwhile, the newly crowned Tsar Nicholas I did not 
approve Alexander’s tactic toward newly incorporated lands as he was rather a believer in a 
policy of fast colonization and russification of new provinces. He wanted an extension of central 
control over the newly acquired western territories.22 In order to do so, in 1829 the old 
constitution of Bessarabia was replaced by a new one drafted by the governor of New Russia, M. 
S. Vorontsov. The laws resulted in practice in a steady process of cultural deterioration. It lifted 
the obligatory usage of the native inhabitants’ language in public administration and primary 
schools.23 In time, the Moldovan language was also removed from Orthodox church services and 
Romanian books, newspapers and periodicals form west of the Prut river were prohibited while 
the Moldovan ones were not allowed to publish.   
 A policy of colonization and russification was continued for several decades with the 
purpose of “increasing the population and weakening the Romanian element in the province. “24 
Although at the beginning of the introduction of the new policy the primary goal of colonization 
was to bring as many people to the newly acquired territories to better exploit the land, later the 
Russian authorities realized that this policy was also helping to diminish the Romanian character 
of the region. Davide Zafi, in his article “Moldovan-Russian Political Relations in Recent 
History” describes the Empire’s policy of colonization by saying “The Russian government had 
to resort to incentives for a strong immigration in order to take under cultivation the ground 
abandoned to itself. New comers were foremost Slavs, but not only: Turks (Gagauz), Bulgarians, 
Germans, French, Poles also settled in the area and added to its already traditional national 
                                                 
22King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics…, p.22. 
23Bruchis, The Republic of Moldova: From the Collapse of the Soviet Empire…, p.12. 
24Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.20. 
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medley.”25 From the Empire's point of view, this kind of attitude toward newly “liberated” 
provinces from Turkish infidels was their “Christian” duty. For instance, twentieth century’s 
Russian historiography presents the annexation of Bessarabia as a liberation of the Christian 
population form the Turks, justified by the brotherhood of religion.26 
Russian rule over Bessarabia was suddenly disturbed by the western powers who, alarmed 
by the Russian expansion around the shores of Black Sea, decided to wage a war against the 
empire. The so-called Crimean War ended with the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1856, which forced 
the Russian Empire to withdraw from the Southern part of Bessarabia, adjacent to Danube River, 
and the region was restored to the Moldovan Province. 27 The Empire, along with other European 
great powers, agreed to respect the integrity of the Romanian regions and its national 
administration. The Romanian authorities immediately began the process of Romanization, 
focusing on reversing the Russian reforms, establishing Romanian schools and publishing houses 
as well as introducing the Romanian language in public administration. However, the Romanian 
efforts to bring about the full Romanian integration of the province appeared to very ineffective 
as ironically  the incorporated lands were the very districts where the Romanian population was 
the least numerous.28 Later on though, through the agreement between Hungary, Austria and 
Russia in 1878 the Russian Empire managed to take back the lost territories. That resulted in the 
intensification of the russification process: all the publications in native language were 
suppressed and the policy of altering the demographic situation in the newly-conquered land 
strengthened. For example, while in the first decade of the annexation the Romanian speakers 
                                                 
25Davide Zafi, Moldavian-Russian Political Relations in Recent History (Rome:  Centro Studi Sulla Storia Dell’ 
Europa Orientale, 2002) , access online 12 April 2012: http://www.csseo.org/Papers/MoldovaDZ.pdf 
26Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule, 21.;  George F Jewsburry, The Russian annexation 
of Bessarabia 1777 – 1828. A Study of Imperial Expansion (Boulder : East European Monographs, No. 28, 1977),  
p.55. 
27Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…,p.14. 
28The region was later incorporated into the Ukrainian soviet Republic and was never recovered by the Moldavian 
Republic, Seton-Watson, The History of Romanians: From Roman Times…, p.562. 
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constituted around the 74% of the population of Bessarabia (990 000) by the end of the century 
Romanian speakers were only 47.6% of the entire population (1, 930, 000).29The ethnic structure 
was different in urban and rural areas. While the cities were almost entirely populated by the 
Russians and Jews30 with strong anti- Romanian attitude, it was mainly Moldovans who 
populated the villages. 31 This situation was strictly related to the high level of illiteracy among 
the Romanian-speaking population. Russified institutions did not reach the Moldovan peasants as 
they all spoke a different language and did not need to learn Russian just for working on rural 
farms. As a result, by the end of the century only 10.5 % of Moldovan men and 1.7% Moldovan 
women could read and write in any language.32 
As Nicholas Dima pointedly puts it, the nineteenth century’s “Russian management of 
Bessarabia was a disaster.”33 The whole province remained highly underdeveloped and the 
population, especially Moldovans, remained overwhelmingly illiterate. The language of the 
native inhabitants was almost completely eliminated from public life.34 Moreover, the region had 
the highest mortality rate in Europe - 50 percent higher than in the empire. 
Nevertheless, during the entire period of Russian rule, Moldovans did not lose their 
linguistic and ethnic (not national) identity. All the writers and artists form Bessarabia and 
Bukovina like Georghr Asachi, Costache Negruzzi or Bogdan Petrieceicu Hesdeu considered 
themselves to be Romanians and their language to be Romanian, as in their historical homeland 
                                                 
29The actual percentage of Romanian speakers could have been higher since the 1897 census tended to count all 
persons with some knowledge of Russian language as “Russians”; King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the 
Politics…,p.23. 
30Over 50, 000 Jews were living in Chisinau in 1897, accounting for nearly half the population. 
31Mitrasca, Moldova, A Romanian Province under Russian Rule…, p.21. 
32B.a.,Pervaia vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naselenia Rossiskoi imprerii, 1897 g., vol.20: Bessarabskaia gubernia, 
(S.Petersburg: 1905), p.130. 
33Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet – Romanian…, p.16. 
34Popovici, The political status of… , 96-109. 
  14 
of ancient Dacia.35 For all the prominent Moldovan figures as well as for Romanian authorities, 
the unification of the old Romanian provinces was the main goal at that time. Even some of the 
Russian administrators acknowledged this possibility, seeing how difficult it was to integrate the 
native inhabitants with the new-comers and within the Russian administration. For instance, the 
famous General A. N. Kuropatkin wrote in his work published in 1910 that “the population of 
Bessarabia lived in isolation and aloof form Russians” and that in the future the unification of 
Moldovans with the Romania might be inevitable.36 On the other hand, the Russian 
administration at that time did not argue that Romanians and Moldovans formed different nations 
(unlike during the Soviet administration when the theory of Moldovans forming a nation distinct 
form the Romanian one was a core principle). Although the last thing Russians wanted was the 
unification of the Romanian nation, their main concern was to extinguish any manifestations of 
non- Russian nationalism and to create a sense of loyalty to the Empire. 37 In the official 
documents, the term Moldovans was used only as an historical name of the population of 
Bessarabia, not to define Bessarabians as separate nation from Romania. 
Yet the national and ethnic self-consciousness among Moldovans was already awakened. 
The first stimulus for the national movement was already the Crimean War of 1853-1856 as it 
provided an excellent opportunity to liberate Bessarabia form the Russian occupiers. Later, the 
Russian revolution of 1905 and the outburst of indignation in the country forced Tsar Nicholas to 
repeal some legislation against ethnic minorities.38 Publishing newspapers and periodicals in 
native language was again allowed. Using this opportunity, young Bessarabian intellectuals 
influenced by the social radicalism in the whole Empire, together with a few Moldovan nobles, 
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founded Moldovan newspaper called Bessarabia. The publishers’ main goals were to spread the 
message of national awakening to the Moldovan peasants, to call for land reform and unification 
with Romania, as well as to promote the idea of the introduction of the Romanian language in the 
schools and public administration.39 Besides the emergence of a pan-Romanian nationalist 
movement, other Moldovan political groups appeared at that time. For instance, the group 
involved the publication of a second Moldovan newspaper, Moldovanul, gathered mostly the 
Moldovan nobles who, although they called for economic emancipation of the region, stayed 
loyal to the Russian authorities. 40 The most active representative of this group and at the same 
time the main editor of Moldovanul, Gheorghe Madan, would become the chief propagator of 
Moldovian language as distinct from Romanian. Finally, there were also groups opposed to the 
Moldovan nationalists like the League of True Russians or Union of Russian People  which 
gathered mostly non-Moldovan inhabitants. 
The turbulence of the First World War, especially the October revolution of 1917 allowed 
the nationalists to implement all of their demands. The newly created Moldovan National Party 
openly requested from the Russian authorities in Chisinau introduction of the principles of 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion. 41 Not waiting for the official response, 
Moldovan soldiers along with peasants and workers organized the Sfatul Tarii (the State Council) 
and on December 2 1917, declared Bessarabia an autonomous republic.42 The proclamation of the 
Sfatul Tarii stated: ”from now on Bessarabia declares itself the Moldovan Democratic Republic, 
which will enter the make-up of the Russian Democratic Federative Republic as participant with 
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equal rights.”43 A month later, seeing the lack of response from the Russian side, nationalists took 
the opportunity and declared Moldova an independent state. However, the threat of Ukrainian 
intervention as well as Russian military action forced some of the districts to call for Romanian 
help which in effect resulted, on March 27 1918, in the proclamation of the unification of the 
Democratic Republic of Moldova with Romania. 
 
 
3. Soviet Policies on the Romanian Border. Creation of MASSR 
 
 
It is not difficult to picture the Russian reaction to such a course of the events. For Soviet 
authorities, the 1918 Union between Bessarabia and Romania was a military, violent annexation 
of Russian territory by taking advantage of the situation in Russia at the end of the First World 
War. Not surprisingly, Romanians saw it from a completely different perspective. Romanian 
historiography places the event in the context of the long expected union of the historically 
Romanian provinces into one state, Greater Romania.44 Yet, the newly created Soviet Union did 
not want to let Bessarabia go and soon commenced an extensive propaganda in order to get back 
the lost territory as soon as possible. For instance, already in 1918 the first propaganda brochures 
read that “Romania had about as much right to Bessarabia as, let us say, Russia had to Ireland, or 
to some provinces belonging to France, Italy , or Japan.”45 On the international scene, the Soviets 
liked to present the annexation as an unlawful action as Bessarabia did not belong to Romania in 
a period preceding Russian rule but to Turkey and therefore there was no possibility for re-
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unification. 46 Nicholas Dima, a specialist on Romanian history form Columbia University, 
pointedly comments on this argument by saying that this line of argument automatically 
eliminated Russian right to Bessarabia because USSR, like Romania, did not exist at that time 
either.47 
The Russian rule over Bessarabia left the region in very poor condition - the infrastructure 
and economic backwardness was unspeakable. Little more than 90 miles of paved roads was built 
during the Russian government, which additionally became inaccessible during the heavy rain.48 
Moreover, Russian authorities had built “ 657 miles of railroad in the Gubernia before 1917, but 
since the railways were designed for strategic rather than economic purposes, they connected 
Bessarabian cities with Russia and Ukraine but not with each other; the primitive state of the 
rolling stock , as well as Russian broad-gauge track, also proved to be major problems.”49  Trade 
with neighboring countries also declined significantly from the moment of reunion with 
Romania. Moldovan wine, one of the main export products, was banned by the Soviets while 
Poland, trying to maintain good relations with Russia, tore up the trade agreements with main 
Moldovan manufacturers. As we will see in the next chapters of this study, such economic 
sabotage was not only characteristic of Soviet policy toward border territories, but will also be 
the strategy of the contemporary Russian government.  
However, the wretched economic state of Bessarabia did not frighten away the Soviets. 
When the Russian efforts to prevent the ratification of Peace Treaty by the great European powers 
failed, Russians came up with “plan B”. 50  The new Soviet strategy consisted of spreading 
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communist propaganda across the borders of Romanian Moldova and thus find  Bessarabian 
supporters of reunion with Russia. In order to do so, the Soviet Union commenced the publishing 
of a communist newspaper in Romanian Plugarul Rosu  (The Red Plowman), used to spread 
Marxist propaganda. Additionally, Bolshevik agents were very active in the Moldovan 
countryside; Soviet planes dropped pamphlets everywhere when occasionally shots were 
exchanged between Russian and Romanian solders.51 Part of the above-mentioned plan was also 
the creation of  Obshchestvo Bessarabtsev (the Bessarabia Association) in Moscow which was 
responsible for the agitating for Moldova’s reunion with the Soviets on the international scene, 
especially in France and Germany. This intensive Soviet agitation resulted in the outburst of three 
anti-capitalist risings in Bessarabian towns: Hotin and Bender in 1919 and Tatar Bunar in 
1924.The brutal suppression of the last one became an excellent opportunity for the Soviets.52 In 
September 1924, one of the Plugarul Rosu’s issues published the letter from Moldoan peasants 
who asked for creation of an autonomous communist republic. 53 Meanwhile Moscow started 
recruiting the leadership for a future communist state. As a result, on October 12 1924, the Soviet 
Union announced the establishment of Moldavian Autonomous Oblast  on land east of  the 
Dniester river in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic  with the capital in Balta, in present-day 
Ukraine.54 Seven months later, the Oblast was upgraded to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR, also called Transnistria) , although its population was only 
30% ethnic Moldovans while Ukrainians made up over 49% of all inhabitants. 55 Its surface area 
was only 8, 300 square kilometers.56 
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The chief aim of Moscow’s decisions was not the creation of the republic itself but rather 
to induce Moldovans living in Romania to agitate for reunification with the Soviet Union and put 
the pressure on Romania in negotiations over Moldovan’s future.57 For instance, Nicholas Dima 
argues that this kind of strategy was used by the Russians in 1920s in the cases of the Karelo-
Finish Socialist Republic, in the Tadzhik Republic in Central Asia Buriat-Mongol Autonomous 
Republic: Russians worked through communist agitation toward incorporation into certain 
territory into the Soviet empire.58 Immediately after the creation of MASSR, which later was also 
called Transnistria, the Soviets begun to speak of Moldovans as if they were another nation, 
different form Romanians. That was also the part of the Russians’ policy on border regions. They 
used the propaganda of national liberation to draw those lands away from “the capitalist states” 
like Romania or Finland.59 But the data from the first years following the emergence of MASSR 
in an eloquent testimony that the republic was the artificially created administrative-political 
formation aimed at serving as a permanent reminder of Russia's firm stand on Bessarabia.60 For 
instance, the party regional committee, the chief authority at that moment, consisted mainly of 
non-Moldovan Bessarabian activists, while in the Moldavian Communist Party  at the end of 
1924, there were only 6.3% of Moldovans representatives.61 
In the 1920s the notion that Moldovans constituted a separate ethno - national group was 
the Bolsheviks’ crucial argument against Romanian possession of Bessarabia. Therefore, the first 
years after the birth of Transnistria were marked by Moldovan nation-building. The so-called 
“process of  “Moldovianization” was mainly focused on creation of a distinct Moldovan literary 
language and education of the peasants and thus bringing them into the structures of “genuinely 
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Moldovan republic” and more importantly, into the communist party.62 For example, in 1925 the 
first dictionary of the Moldovan language was published using the Cyrillic alphabet instead of 
Latin script just in order to make the language less similar to Romanian. On top of that, the 
Soviets introduced preferential hiring and promotion for the benefit of non-Russian nationalities, 
began the program of building Moldovan schools and promoting the use of indigenous languages 
in education, as well as commenced the project of lowering the illiteracy level among Moldovan 
woman. 
Meanwhile, during the entire interwar period communist activists as well as Soviet agents 
in Romania were involved in a range of Soviet agitprop activities aimed at organizing the 
revolution in Romanian Bessarabia. However it did not produce the expected results.  The main 
reason why the “export of revolution“ failed was that although Moldovan peasants “were hardly 
enthusiastic about the presence of Romanian gendarmes and soldiers”, they were even less 
supportive of Soviet calls for the Collectivization of land and expropriation of peasant property.63  
Not without significance was the legacy of Russian rule over Bessarabia in the previous century. 
Moldovans remembered very well how the Russian empire’s authorities harshly treated the native 
inhabitants and therefore preferred to stay within the newly created Greater Romania than to risk 
returning to Russian government. A similar process can be seen in the more recent history of 
relations between those two nations after the collapse of Soviet Union which will be described in 
the next chapter.  
 In the given situation, the Soviet Union was forced to abandon its aggressive 
international policy and to temporarily accept Romanian possession of the province. Between 
1928 and 1939 Romania and the USSR signed a series of bilateral treaties that were concluded 
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with the exchange of ambassadors and the establishing of diplomatic relations in 1934. Moreover, 
during the same year the USSR asked to be a member of the League of Nations and Romania, an 
important state in the organization, was a great supporter of it. 64 Thus the Soviet Union became 
constrained to obey the international legal provisions created by the League, which included the 
territorial integrity of the member states.65The dispute over the status of Bessarabia became loud 
again with the signing by the Soviets of the Ribbentrop - Molotov treaty which in the secret 
protocol indicated the Soviet sphere of influence over the entire eastern Europe, including the 
territory of Romanian Bessarabia. 
Simultaneously in Tansnistria the Soviet nation-building policy underwent significant 
changes. In the years 1937 and 1938 the Stalinist purges and the massive ethnic cleansing 
continued. This sudden shift away from the policy of nation-building was, according to the theory 
of Terry Martin the result of the Soviet xenophobia. However, by Soviet xenophobia Martin does 
not mean the traditional reluctance toward foreigners but “the exaggerated Soviet fear of foreign 
influence and foreign contamination.”66  The Soviet national consolidation projects throughout 
the 1920’s gave a certain freedoms and rights to the Soviet nationalities what, in torn, awakened 
the Russian’s suspicious of foreign capitalist countries influencing the Soviet regions.  
In effect the party-state activists of Autonomous Republic together with leading cadres of 
culture and literature ended up being repressed.67 As replacements Russian authorities chose 
young communist activists from Ukraine and MASSR and ambitious workers who were 
completely unfamiliar with the culture and national identity of Moldovans and in their majority 
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did not even know the Moldovan language. The aggressive nationalist policy practiced on the 
autochthons resulted in “severing the Moldovans form the east bank of the Dniester river” from 
their own culture and transforming their language into “a Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian jargon”.68  
The changes in Soviet policy included also the sudden decision of using the Latin alphabet in 
literary Moldovan. The source of the “latinization decision” was rooted in the unbending Soviet 
attempts to recapture Romanian Bessarabia. The Soviets this time wanted to emphasize “the 
common bond between the language of the Moldovans of the MASSR and of the Moldovans on 
the other side of the Dniestr” and to “increase the revolutionary influence of the Soviet Socialist 
Moldova on the other side.”69  
This Soviet policy directed at recapturing Bessarabia, on the domestic as well as 
international front, soon brought an expected effect. Alongside with the outbreak of war, the 
German and Russian governments automatically put into effect agreements included in the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in which Hitler acknowledged Russian claims to Bessarabia. On June, 
1940 Stalin issued an ultimatum to the Romanian government demanding the immediate cession 
of the region, including the northern portion of province of Bukovina.70 Taking under 
consideration the fate of Poland, Romania reluctantly agreed to withdraw, but by no means accept 
this loss of territory. In October 1940, the German troops entered Romania and several months 
later Romania became an German ally and when the Soviet-German war broke out on June 22, 
1941, the Romanian army immediately marched into occupied Bessarabia.71   In a month 
Romanian and German troops managed to free Bessarabia as well as Soviet Transnistria and then 
reintegrate them into Romania. Yet Romanian rule, marked by the brutal anti-Jewish policy,  did 
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not last long In 1944 the course of war changed in favor of the Allied Powers, Transnistria again 
came under Soviet control, and the Red Army advanced westward into the territory of Romanian 
Bessarabia and southern Bukovina.72 Soon after the Russians demanded from the Romanian 
government the restoration of the 1940 boundary, promising in exchange not to interfere in 
internal Romanian domestic affairs.73 Bessarabia’s doom was sealed as the western powers 
during the 1944 conferences eventually decided to give  the Soviets a free hand in eastern 
Europe. A 1947 treaty formally returned Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Transnistria to 
Soviet Union.  
 
 
4. Soviet policy vs. Native inhabitants. The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MSSR), 1944-1989 
 
 
The new communist republic that emerged from Russian annexation was “both more and 
less than historic Bessarabia.”74 The newly created region was composed of six administrative 
units of former Romanian Bessarabia and six eastern raions of Transnistria.75 According to the 
demographic structure of the newly recaptured land, the Russians decided to incorporate into the 
Ukrainian SSR the part of Transnistria with the Ukrainian majority as well as part of the counties 
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of Hotin in northern Bessarabia and Akkerman, and Ismail in southern Bessarabia.76 The 
Transnistria areas included in the MSSR, on the other hand, were those with the largest group of 
native Moldovans as they composed almost half of the entire population. However, Charles King 
claims that there was an even more important rationale than the demographic in the 
administrative changes undertaken by the Soviets. Namely, “the inclusion of Bessarabia’s Danube 
and Black Sea frontage in the Ukrainian SSR placed these strategic assets in the hands of a 
reliable Soviet Republic rather than leaving them under the control of the newly created entity 
and the potential object of Romanian irredentism.”77 Regardless of the Soviet goals, the new 
Moldovan Soviet republic was second smallest after Armenian SSR with the population 2.4 
million and 33 700 square kilometers surface. 
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Map 2. The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 1944-199178
 
 
 
With the restoration of Russian government in Bessarabia, the Stalin regimes policy was 
to russify the population as soon as possible and annihilate any remaining ties between the MSSR 
inhabitants and Romania.79 Leonid Brezhnev, first secretary of the MSSR Communist Party, at 
the beginning of his term noted that “these remote raions lying along the Dniester had to break 
through to socialism by the shortest possible path.”80 This declaration meant in practice the 
implementation of total collectivization of agriculture in the first post-war years. The 
government’s policies of requisitioning huge supplies of agriculture products despite poor 
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harvests - induced a famine following the catastrophic drought of 1945-47.81 There are some 
evidence that the famine of 1946 – 50 was not the tragic consequence of cumulating factors - 
collectivization, drought and mass deportation - but rather the purposeful operation of the Soviets 
aimed at rural Moldovans ill-disposed toward new regime. 82 But the tragic outcome of 
collectivization did not stop the Soviets away from conducting further repressive polices against 
Moldovan peasants. During the years 1947-51 the Soviets also carried out a massive deportation 
campaign which in all resulted in the deportation of 16,000 Moldovans peasant families. For 
example, in only two days, July 6-7, 1949 over 11,000 Bessarabian families were targeted for 
deportation to Kurgan, Tiumen, Irkutsk, and other destinations in Siberia and Kazakhstan in the 
plan “Operation South”.83  
Along with collectivization the Soviets decided to change the structure of the MSSR 
Communist Party in order to create a support group for themselves among native people. Hence, 
in 1949 over 50% of newly selected members of the Party were Moldovans. Thus, the Soviets 
created the illusion that Moldovans themselves had the right to decide on the fate of republic 
through the Soviet institution.  The years right after the annexation were also marked by Soviet 
striving to impose the “Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian jargon”, used already on the left bank of the 
Dniester, upon the Bessarabian Moldovans.84 Immediately after taking over Bessarabia, Soviet 
authorities ordered the publication of all the school textbooks, newspapers and works of fiction in 
this jargon, using the Cyrillic alphabet. However this decision encountered the significant 
opposition from Bessarabian society, especially prominent Moldovan writers. As most of those 
writers were loyal communist activists agitating during the war in favor of the Soviets, the latter 
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decided to step back from the harsh language policy. Not for long, however. During the entire 
1950s the Soviets continued the constant reduction of the Moldovan language from public 
administration as well as the systematic transformation of the latter’s conversational form into 
Moldovan-Russian jargon.85 
Stalin’s death in 1953 and the Khrushchev’s policy surprisingly did not weaken the 
sovietisation process in Moldovan republic.  The domination of the Russian language in the 
public sphere, the massive Slavic migration into the Moldovan territory as well as the constant 
deportation of the native inhabitants to Central Asia and Siberia continued and in the long – term 
resulted in the further “demoldovianization” of the republic. It was especially visible in the 
demographic data of that time. For example, Moldovan constituted some 68 percent of the 
population in 1941, but only 63.9 percent by the 1978 census. Ukrainians, on the other hand, rose 
from 11.1 percent in 1941 to 13.8 percent in 1989. The Russians population doubled within those 
years. 86 The natural consequence of those demographic changes as well as the Moscow’s desire 
to widen the control over Soviet territories was the disproportionate presence of Slavs in every 
sphere of public life.87 Moreover, the Communist Party that was supposed to represent the entire 
population of the republic was dominated by Ukrainians and Russians while Moldovans were 
holding the least important offices. Similar domination appeared in the cultural life as well. The 
cultural and scientific urban centers were developed by non-Moldovans, especially Russians, and 
thus the high culture of the republic quickly became fully russified. The culture of Moldovans 
was developed only in the rural area, the only area where Moldovans reminded a majority. 
Therefore the Bessarabian culture was limited to the folklore and the folk art and “for many years 
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shared nothing in common with the superimposed [Soviet] culture.”88 A Similar situation was 
noted in academia. In over 60 research centers all over Moldavia that employed altogether over 6, 
000 scientific workers only around 25 percent of them were ethnic Moldovans.89 Additionally, all 
the publications and the newspapers were either published by non-Moldovans or subjected to the 
Soviet editing.  
This situation raised remarkable resentment among the native population that was tired of 
the constant indoctrination and control. On one hand, Bessarabians, who were struggling to 
preserve their own language and culture for almost 30 years after the Second World War, started 
to understand that they cannot really expect any shift of Russian policy. Thus, tired of struggling 
with the Russian authorities, they were ready to give up their own national identity and to became 
well-integrated subjects of the Soviet system. But, on the other hand, the tragic condition of the 
Union’s economy, uncertain political situation and the common atmosphere of resignation gave 
the oppressed nation one more reason to fight for its rights. As Nicholas Dima rightly puts it, “In 
their desperation, some of the more advanced Soviet nationalities, motivated by the concern for 
survival, begun to reassert their national rights without any fear.”90  
 The beginning of 1980’s was marked by the Moldovan national awakening, as the new 
generation of Moldovan activists and intellectuals became very active on the political scene. 
During that time the language question became central to the national movement. Moldovan 
politicians demanded the introduction of the Moldovan language in the public institutions, 
including schools. Bessarabian cultural and academic elites were also pressing for the transition 
to the Latin alphabet and the recognition of the a Moldovan-Romanian languages’ union. But the 
Moldovan leaders radically shifted their demands when in September 1983 the enormous 
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environmental disaster in Lvov took place. More that a billion gallons of salts form fertilizers 
spilled into the Dniest river and contaminated the source of water for every major Moldovan city 
and killed wildlife along the river.91  The Moldovan activists in the Communist Party 
immediately demanded an investigation and raised accusations against the conservative 
communist leaders whom they held responsible for the incident. 
 The repercussions of the Dniestr disaster coincided with a radical change of the Soviet 
policy - the political movement of pierestroika and glasnost’ founded by the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party, Michail Gorbachev. The policy of “openness” and economic reconstruction 
commenced the transformation of the rusty Soviet system and inspired the major changes in the 
politics of the Union’s republics. 92 This movement, in turn, inspired tens of thousands of native 
Bessarabians to express their discontent with the local authorities and commence the extensive 
public debate regarding the national identity of Moldovans. Thus, from denouncing the 
ecological disaster of the Dniestr, “Moldovans moved toward claiming their cultural rights, and 
then, toward demanding the creation of the independent Moldovan government.”93  
However, the First Secretary of the Moldovan Party, Semion Grossu, successfully 
managed to slow down the pace of political transformations, as he was not interested in reforms 
that would remove the old, Stalinist-style cadre from the office. Yet, assistance for the Moldovan 
national movement came surprisingly from Moscow. During the 19th conference of Soviet 
Communists Gorbachev announced the new program of the revolutionary reforms that included 
“the multicandidate elections, the retreat from the party’s dominance in the economy, and the 
greater sensitivity to the nationalities question.”94 The Soviet policy shift was further confirmed 
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in the articles published by the Moldovan Konsomol Congres that set up the introduction of the 
new language and social reforms. This, in turn, gave an impulse for to establishment of the 
Moldovan quasi- political organizations with the most prominent among them being: Moldovan 
Movement in Support of Reconstructing and the Alexei Mateevici Literary-Musical Club.95 The 
founding fathers of those organizations, Bessarabian journalists and political activists, stressed 
the need to change the status of the Moldovan language and they demanded the recognition of the 
identity of Moldovans. Most importantly however, they called for the transformation of Soviet 
Union into a federation of independent states, which can be seen as the first step toward the 
Moldovan sovereignty. 96 After officially announcing those demands to the Soviet authorities, 
Moldovan organizations held in Chisinau massive public demonstrations in support for the 
Moldovan national movement. Later, in the mid-1989 the meeting of the political activists of all 
Moldovan organizations took place. They agreed upon the foundation of the Moldovan Popular 
Front - the first Moldovan National Party.97 Under the pressure from both, Gorbachev’s 
government in Moscow and the Moldovan nationalists, Grossu eventually agreed upon legalizing 
the Moldovan party.  “It was the end of the communist monopoly of power” and the beginning of 
the Moldovan path toward the independence from the Soviet state. 98 
The almost two centuries of the harsh policy of russification influenced the Moldovan's 
perception of the Russian authorities. The suppression of every aspect of the Moldovan social life 
and the radical shift in 1937 away from the nation-building policy that was started after the First 
World War significantly strengthened the local population’s reluctance towards the Soviets. The 
native inhabitants of one of the best integrated republics into the Soviet system suddenly started 
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to look for the answers regarding their national identity. Taking advantage of the crisis in the 
Soviet Union in the 1980’s, Moldovans decided to take an active part in the political life of their 
motherland. The reconstruction period brought the first divisions of the Soviet society between 
the advocates of the perestroika- Moldovans, and its adversaries- non-Moldovans, mostly 
Russians and Ukrainians. Thus, Bessarabians stopped viewing the interest pursued by the Soviet 
Union as their own and started to look for political assistance in neighboring Romania and 
Western European countries.  As Davide Zaffi rightly puts it, “One seems justified in asserting 
that the way Moldovans acted or reacted both in the international context and in internal affairs 
[after the proclamation of independence] was determined or largely influenced by the attitude 
they successively took towards Russia.”99 
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Chapter II 
The Establishment of the Political and Economic 
Co-operation. 1989 – 1999 
 
1. On the Path to Independence. 1989-1991 
 
Although the government of Moldova Did not declare the full independence before 
August 1991, it began the path to independence from the USSR already two years earlier. As 
Charles King puts it, one could call the years between 1989 and 1991 “the crusade for rectifying 
and appropriating the Moldovans’ genuine national identity after a half century of Soviet rule.” 
100 Accordingly on August 31, 1989, the MSSR Supreme Soviet adopted the „Language Act“ that 
declared Moldovan the state language of the republic , it “mandated the transition to Latin 
alphabet, implicitly recognized the unity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages, and set out 
the broad program for extending the use of Moldovan in government, education, and the national 
economy.“101 In this way the Soviet Republic of Moldova became the first of the Union’s entities 
that established the language of native inhabitants as the first official language. According to 
Daria Fane, the American political scientist, this new legislation proved to be a turning point in 
republic’s politics and caused the rise of nationalism among both Moldovans and those ethnic 
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minorities who opposed the legislation, especially Russians.102 
The question of minorities was in Moldova especially significant, as the republic had a 
large non-Moldovan minority - 35,7% all in all, with the largest group being Ukrainian (584 196, 
13,8%) and Russian (540 900, 13%).103The rapid development of Moldovan nationalism, 
mirrored in the introduction of the new language Act, triggered harsh responses from the 
Russian-speaking minority in the Transnistrian region as well as from the Gagauz minority in the 
southern part of the republic. The question of minorities in Moldova was especially significant, as 
the republic had a large non-Moldovan minority population – 35.7% in all, with the largest group 
being Ukrainian (584 196, 13.8%) and Russian (540,900, 13%).104 
Table 1. Largest minority groups in Moldova, 1989 and 2004105  
Groups Number of 
persons    
In 1989 
Number of 
persons  in 
2004 
% share of 
total 
population in 
1989 
% share of 
total 
population in 
2004 
Ukrainians 600 000 283 367 13.8 8.4 
Russians 562 000 198 144 13 5.8 
Gagauz 157 500 147 661 3.5 4.4 
Bulgarians 90000 65 072 2 1.9 
Other 121 500 44 350 2.7 1.3 
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Immediately after the introduction of a new language law ethnic minorities started to form 
their own national organizations, equivalent to Moldovan Popular Front. For example, several 
Transnistrian workers’ collectives led by Igor Smirnof, a Russian factory manager who came to 
Moldova in November 1987, “united under the single banner of the Union of Workers Collectives 
(OSTK) and pursued a policy of secession from Moldova.”106 Moreover, parallel to the 
establishment of OSTK, a Slavic militant group emerged from the organization Edinstvo, famous 
among  the Soviet republics for its opposition to the reforms of the 1980s. The vehement 
nationalist movements of the minority groups were an answer to the progressing 
Moldovanization of the public life. Along with the removal of Russian as the dominant language, 
Moldovan authorities began closing the Russian schools and started to favor Moldovan nationals 
in the public administration.  This course of events created fears among ethnic groups in Moldova 
of losing their national identity, social status and economic sovereignty.107  The slogans of the 
Popular Front regarding the unification with Romania, which became more popular day by day, 
only added  insult to injury. As the summer of 1989 progressed, leaders of  the Transnistria and 
Gagauz regions initiated massive strikes in enterprises in all cities with large Russian-speaking 
populations such as Tiraspol, Bender and Ribnita.108 Simultaneously, the emerging Russian 
minority’s  nationalist movement began to lobby Soviet authorities. It is worth noticing that the 
leadership of the Russian minority movement was largely made up of the Russian functionaries 
who had been dispatched to the Moldova Republic during the Gorbachev era.109 According to the 
International Crisis Group’s report most of them were conservative communists who opposed the 
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reform policy of Mikhail Gorbachev and by leading the national movement of Russian- speakers 
in Moldova, wanted to keep the republic within the Soviet Union and to maintain their privileged 
position.110 
As a result of those developments Moscow’s authorities decided to support Transnistria’s 
striving for separation from Moldova. This process had been accelerated by the Moldova’s 
Supreme Soviet’s decision to declare autonomy within the Soviet Union in July 1990. A two 
months later the Moldovan parliament, now called Sfatul Tarii, appointed as head of a state, the 
leader of Popular Front Mircea Snegur who was reluctant to any kind of dependence on Moscow 
and was a proponent of the reorientation toward Romania. As in consequence,  tensions between 
the Kishinev and Moscow deepened. On September 2, 1990, the Soviet Interior Ministry 
mobilized troops to protect the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Transnistrian region 
from the “Moldovan nationalists” as it proclaimed the Dniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic within the USSR, also known as DMR.111 Soon after the announcement non-Moldovan 
separatists along with the Soviet representatives commenced in taking local control over the 
major institutions and state administration. Moreover, KGB representatives and various Soviet 
ministries began to meet in regular sessions to discuss the future strategies, including military 
intervention and attitude toward the Moldovan government.112  Soviet leaders, in the face of 
growing nationalism in Kishinev, decided to sabotage Moldava’s unification with Romania by 
threatening it with territorial disintegration.  
In spite of ongoing tensions between Moscow and Kishinev regarding the Transnistia 
question, the slow agony of the disintegrating Soviet Empire pushed the two republics to attempt 
                                                 
110 Ibid. 
111 B.a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria (Brussels: International Crisis Group, European Report nr. 
157), p.2. 
112 .a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria…, p.2. 
112 Ibid. 
  36 
on September 22, 1990 to establish diplomatic relations. Leaders of both republics met in 
Moscow and signed the Moldovan- Russian Treaty of Partnership that constituted the interstate 
relations between the Socialist Republic of Moldova and the Soviet Socialist Federal Republic of 
Russia.113 For the Moldovan side this agreement was a first signal that the Russians might 
eventually accept the sovereignty of Moldova. However, for the Russians it was rather an attempt 
to maintain Bessarabia within the Soviet Union and to suppress the Moldovan independence 
movement. Eventually both of the Supreme Soviets in Moscow and Kishinev failed to  ratify the 
Treaty and  official diplomatic relations were not established until five years later.  
 Meanwhile minority leaders headed by Igor Smirnof, soon the first president of 
Dniestrian Republic, made moves to create their own governmental structure. They started to 
form their own ministries and took over all the buildings housing the Moldovan state institutions. 
Consequently over the next several months skirmishes between the central government troops 
and the armed separatists escalated, culminating in an prolonged fighting outside the city of 
Dubosari on November 2, 1990, between Moldovan police on one side and armed irregulars 
supported by the separatists on the other.114 In face of these events Mircea Snegur asked Mikhail 
Gorbachev to put an end to the secessionist conflict. 115 In return he offered to accept the Russian 
proposal of “Union of Sovereign States” which meant the reorganization of the Soviet Union into 
a new confederative body. However, Gorbatchev did not take the offer and instead on November 
25 he sent the troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry in order to protect the planned elections for 
the Supreme Soviet of the breakaway DMR.116 President Snegur, in turn, officially decided  to 
fulfill the main goal of the Moldovan Popular Front and to proclaim independence from Moscow. 
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In order to do so, already at the end of the year he commenced with the formation of the 
government of an independent state with the prime objective to preserve its territorial integrity.117 
It is worth noticing that the “Snegur Plan” provided special policy toward ethnic groups that 
would enable them to easily adapt to the new political system. For example, the Radio Free 
Europe news read that the new government of Bessarabia was going to promote “a revival of the 
Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian languages and cultures in Moldova, long subject to 
russiafication, and to encouraging (sic) Russians to renounce Soviet ideology in favor of Russian 
cultural traditions.”118 
As a result of the growing disagreements between Moscow and Kishinev the latter 
boycotted the all-Union referendum on March 17 concerning the future membership in the 
proposed successor state of the USSR. Voting took place only in Transnistria where “the vote was 
supposedly 93% in favor of the unitary Soviet state.”119 Simultaneously, the presidential elections 
were held in the breakaway region where Igor Smirnof, the head of the radical communist camp, 
had been elected.  
In the first half of 1991 the situation in Moldova and its separatist region of  Transnistia 
was rather stable.120 Occasional clashes between Russian supported rebels and Moldovan troops 
appeared in the cities of Bender and Dubosari but they were considered more as fights between 
local hooligans than regular armed conflict.  Transnistrian authorities with Soviet representatives 
focused on dissolving the Moldovan financial, administrative and military institutions and 
creating Dniestrian ones instead. In April the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the KGB 
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directors and Russian ministries discussed the plausible dissolution of Moldovan law 
enforcement bodies and as a  result a month later  all of them were put under Transnistian 
jurisdiction and the local police and judiciary branches were established.121 Moreover, the 
Russian Agroprombank created the first branch of the National Bank of Transnistria in which the 
local enterprises opened  accounts forming the first state budget.122Finally, the 14th Soviet army, 
stationed in the region, as yet unofficially supporting the rebels in skirmishes with the Moldovan 
government, began to provide direct military aid to the insurgency, supplying it with the weapons 
indispensable for fighting with central government. At the same time Moldova became virtually 
cut off from the rest of the Soviet Empire. ”The major rail and road links to Ukraine and beyond 
run through the east-bank city of Rybnita, Dubasari, and Tiraspol, all of whose local councils had 
declared their allegiance to the Transnistrian republic.”123 In response, in March the Moldovan 
authorities issued protest notes to Supreme Soviet and Russian defense ministry complaining 
about the army’s assistance to the rebels. 124 It noted, inter alia, that the soldiers of  Soviet 14th 
army helped to form the new DMR army and the Dniestr Guards that was commanded by the 
high ranking officers of the Russian army.  
The events of August 19-21 involving the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Gorbatchev 
proved to be a turning point in Russian- Moldovan relations as well as for the future course of the 
Transnistrian conflict. 125  The August putsch, as the overthrown was later called, had its roots in 
the ever weakening position of the communist party within the Soviet state and in the process of 
gaining power by the new liberal political leadership advocating the disintegration of the current 
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the Soviet state. Many of  the hardline communists strongly opposed all of the new reforms, 
especially the project of the “Union of Sovereign States” proposed by Gorbatchev, which would 
have given more power to the republics’ governments and consequently weakened the position of 
the  “ruling class” in the Kremlin. In order to prevent the new reforms and save their power 
credentials, “part of the top-level party and state administration members tried to take the power 
in their hands … and to restore the former, pre-1985 situation in the USSR, that is to eliminate 
multi-party system, commercial structures, in destroying the rudiments of democracy.”126 
Fortunately, the putsch was organized very poorly and neither population nor army supported the 
use of force against the legitimate power and the citizens who defend it. 127 
The August coup emphasized the significant differences between Moldova and 
Transnistria as the reactions of the regional authorities to the putsch were completely  different. 
In Kishinev, for example, the Moldovan Communist Party leaders headed by Grigore Eremei and 
the Popular Front led by Mircea Snegur sided against the putsch organizers. In Transnistria, on 
the other hand, Igor Smirnof “publically praised the putschists  as saviors of the Soviet state and 
promised military assistance to support the state of emergency.”128  Transnistria’s attachment to 
hardline communism attracted unreformed communists from other Soviet republics and after the 
coup some of them, like Vladimir Shevtsov, took high offices in the breakaway republic.129  
Most importantly, the unsuccessful putsch and the defeat of the camp that wanted to 
preserve the USSR hastened Moldova’s independence decision. On August  27, 1991, Alexander 
Mosanu, president of the Moldovan parliament, proclaimed Moldova’s independence from the 
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Soviet state and took control over Soviet assets on the Moldovan territory.130 This declaration 
“invoked historical rights and democratic legitimacy as the basis for statehood“ and called the 
world’s states for recognition of independent Moldova and establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the country.131 Moreover, the government of the newly independent state immediately 
passed a series of resolutions regarding the formation of the central and local state institutions 
that would take over all of the responsibilities performed until then by the Soviet authorities. In 
addition, the parliament “passed a decree rescinding all articles in the republic’s constitution that 
related to Moldova’s membership in the Soviet Union”. A special delegation was also sent to 
Moscow in order to discuss the matters regarding the succession from USSR. 132  They agreed, 
for instance, that Moldovan government would take over all the enterprises belonging to the 
Soviets, including the heavy-industry factories on the territory of DMR  (later confirmed in the 
parliament’s decree no. 234 on November 14, 1991).133  Several days after the declaration Snegur 
along with most notable Moldovan politicians, commenced negotiations with government in 
Bucharest regarding the eventual reunification of the country with Romania.     
The news about the possible unification with Bucharest raised panic among the Dniestrian 
officials. The critical moment came when Kishinev targeted the leaders of the separatist 
movement, including Igor Smirnof, arrested them and charged them with supporting the illegal 
Moscow coup.134 In response the DMR threatened the Moldovan government  with cutting the 
gas and electricity supplies as well as blocking the rail lines leading west of the river.135  Once the 
leaders were released on September 2, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria adopted its own 
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constitution, officially proclaimed its independence from Moldova and announced its 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. Smirnof later explained this decision by arguing that this 
declaration was necessary to protect the Russian and Ukrainian minorities in the DMR from the 
possible reunification of Moldova with Romania.136 Taking into account the violent conflict 
between Russians and Romanians in the region,  Transnistrians with reasons felt they might be 
oppressed under  Romanian rule. 137 
In regards to the Soviet Union itself, after the victory of Yeltsin camp it was obvious that 
the Union would dissolve sooner or later. After the coup attempt the fear that the Gorbachev’s 
reforms would be withdrawn pushed the Soviet republics to quickly declare independence from 
the Union. Consequently on December 8, 1991, the representatives from Moscow along with 
leaders from Belarus and Ukraine signed an agreement dissolving the Union and establishing the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) instead an entity in which Moldova would 
eventually take an active part.138 
 
2. The Relations between Sovereign States.  
The Transnistrian Conflict 
 
 
        Even though the Soviet empire had collapsed Russian authorities still wanted to maintain 
their grip on former Soviet republics, including Moldova and Transnistira, through the CIS 
organization. On the other hand the newly born states wanted to assure their sovereignty and 
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were very cautious about joining an organization dominated by  the Russians. Nevertheless, they 
were drawn to the organization by economic necessity.139 Moreover, in case of Moldova the 
threat that Russia might get involved in the ethnic conflict within the Moldavan state, if Kishiniev 
refused to join CIS, was an additional factor that compelled the country to apply for a 
membership. 
 Still hoping to avoid Russian influence, at the beginning of the negotiations in Moscow 
in December 1991, president Snegur strongly opposed the formation of CIS, seeing it as a 
different form of the Russian control similar to that of the Soviet Union. On   December 8, 1991, 
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) quoted the president who said that “with every 
passing day, … the desire of certain state leaders to return to the organization of the former USSR 
is becoming increasingly apparent… .”140 Nevertheless, the broken economic ties between the 
Soviet entities had serious repercussions on people’s living conditions, which in turn made the 
political situation in Moldova unstable and forced Snegur to plead for economic cooperation with 
CIS states.141 After the collapse of the Soviet Union Moldova relied almost exclusively on the 
former Soviet republics for raw materials and fuel.142 Although it tried to find new economic 
partners outside the post-Soviet world, it was highly difficult as foreign countries conditioned 
their cooperation with the Former Soviet Republics on the Russians’ reaction. For example, in 
1992 the only countries that established economic relations with Moldova were, obviously, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Kuwait, the United States and Israel. 
The main sticking point between Moldovan authorities and the CIS was the military 
cooperation clause that included the prohibition of maintaining countries’ own arm forces and the 
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establishment of joint  military command structures (which meant in practice agreeing to CIS 
army’s presence in the member states). For Moldovans this reservation meant that they agreed to 
the presence of 14th army that had provided assistance to the insurgents in fighting with 
Moldovan troops in Transnistira. Moreover, even though the statutes of CIS forbade the 
interference into the domestic affairs of any member state, every member had the right to engage 
in ”measures that aim at the suppression of the danger that might occur in respect to the 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of a member state of the commonwealth.” 143 This 
meant in practice that the Russian army,  for example, could enter the territory of Moldovan 
republic every time they assumed the security or sovereignty of the state was in danger. However, 
unlike the previous union CIS, did not possess the supranational prerogatives that would allow 
the organization to constantly interfere in the domestic policy of constituent states and was more 
focused on the intensification  of interstate cooperation.144 
In the middle of December 1991 Moldova signed the CIS chapter (also called the Alma-
Ata Protocol) that established the Commonwealth of Independent States with the reservation that 
Moldova would not enter the structures of military cooperation within the organization. 145 This 
decision strongly influenced the later Russian-Moldovan relations as Moscow repeatedly tied the 
withdrawal of the 14th army to Moldova’s participation in some type of security arrangement with 
Russia.146  
Meanwhile, the new Russian authorities with reformist Boris Yeltsin as a head of the state 
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faced the challenge of creating a new foreign policy toward “the Near Abroad”.147 So far, the 
directions of policy were indicated by communist ideology so when the Soviet Union dissolved 
Russia’s first priority became to define the national interest that would, in turn, determine the 
foreign policy of the state.148 To define the national interest it was necessary to decide who 
belongs to the Russian nation. The question was whether the Russian nation meant all the 
Russian speakers, including those who lived outside the Federation, or should it be confined only 
to people of the Russian descent.  The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs led by Andrei Kozyrev , 
which was responsible for determining the policy guidelines, was still in the hands of the “hard  
liners” who wanted to maintain Russian power over the former Soviet republics. Respectively, 
the Ministry quickly figured that if the main goal of the foreign policy would be to protect the 
Russian-speaking people living in post-Soviet states, the Russian government would have an easy 
excuse to intervene in the post-Soviet space. In February 1992, for example, Kozyrev stated that 
“while Russia respected the sovereignty of the newly-formed states Russia would strictly defend 
its own interests…including not only economic ties but preservation of a unified army…and the 
protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in other CIS states.”149  
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3. Russian Involvement in the Transnistrian War 
 
 
Taking under consideration the Russians’ new foreign policy approach it is easy to 
conjecture their attitude toward the Transnistrian conflict and the independent Republic of 
Moldova itself. The majority of the diplomatic relations between the end of 1992 and 1999 
revolved around Russian involvement in the Dnister conflict and finding a solution to this 
problem that would satisfy all three sides.  
In early 1992, as the conflict between the secessionists and the Moldovan troops 
intensified the newly elected president of Dniestrian republic Smirnof began a “campaign of 
harassment” to throw all “pro-Moldovan elements” out of the separatist republic.150 To be able to 
implement this plan the government in Tiraspol asked Moscow for support. In response, Kremlin, 
sent hundreds of mercenaries, Cossacks and other military personnel to the Dniester region 
through the Ukrainian border.151 “The Cossacks and other volunteers were put on the Russian 
state payroll, receiving 3000 rubles a month.”152  Moreover, some sources reported that the 
separatist government was granted several million rubles in aid to support its military activists by 
the authorities in Moscow.153  
The major element of the Russian involvement in the conflict in Moldova was the Soviet 
14th army stationed on the left bank of the Dniester river. When the government in Kishinev did 
not agree to join the military structure of CIS and demanded to be given  control over all Soviet 
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army forces and equipment located in Moldova  Russians rejected those demands.154 However, 
seeing that the presence of army in Transnistria was a great bargaining chip  in the shaping of 
Moldova-Russia relations they left the status of the 14th army to further negotiations. A couple of 
weeks later “the commanding general of 14th Army, Lieutenant General Gennadii Yakovlev, 
accepted the position of Chief of Defense for the Dniester Republic and placed the 14th Army 
troops and equipment at the disposal of the government.”155 Consequently at the beginning of the 
year, the 14th army occupied Grigoriopol, Dubosari Tiraspol and Ribnita so that Moldovan troops 
could not enter the cities and prevent the planed secession. 156  
The skirmishes escalated into outright war in March, just after Moldova’s accession to the 
United Nations on March 2, 1993. Transnistrian forces led by the high-ranking Russian officers, 
along with 14th Army’s soldiers, attacked police offices in Bandera and Dubosari. The Moldovan 
army was not able to take control over the cities. The fighting lasted for a couple of weeks and 
resulted in approximately 1000 deaths, while 130,000 people  were either internally displaced or 
sought refuge in other countries.157 This course of events was a shock for Moldovan authorities. 
They immediately protested to the CIS organs calling for the CIS military to intervene in the 
conflict as peacekeepers along with United Nations peacekeeping mission.158 However, as Russia 
had a dominant position in the organization and used it rather as an instrument of influencing the 
policy of the former Soviet republics, CIS did not meet Kishinev’s demands. Additionally, at the 
Helsinki Foreign Ministers Conference, Kishinev, along with the Romanian representatives, 
protested the activities of the separatist troops as well as the obvious Russian support of the 
insurgents. In response to their call Boris Yeltsin signed the decree which placed the 14th Army 
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under the Yeltsin’s personal command, what made it impossible for Moldova to take over the 
command of the 14th Army. 159 One of the Army’s Commanders, Jevgenii Nietkachov proposed 
that the 14th Army would become the peacekeeping force. This was ridiculous, taking into 
consideration the role the Army had played in the conflict so far. 160 In Moscow Vice-President 
Aleksander Rutskoi openly supported the Transnistrian separatist movement, called the Russian 
Congress of Peoples Deputies to recognize Dnistrian sovereignty and to support the 
Transnistrians in their conflict with the  Moldovan government. The Russian Congress of 
People’s Deputies applied those instructions on April 8 ,  1993.161 A month later Rutskoy visited 
the breakaway region and gave a speech in which he emphasized the responsibility of the Russian 
authorities to protect the 25 million Russians who were living outside Russia’s borders and 
promised to  intensify the Russian support if needed. Rafał Morawiec, the specialist on 
Moldova’s politics from the Polish Academy of Science, pointedly called Russian policy toward 
Moldova and Transnistria as an new “Brezhnev Doctrine.” 162 
 But not everyone in the Kremlin supported this radical stand on the Dniestrian conflict. 
Both major foreign policy representatives, Boris Yeltsin and Minister Kozyrev called for 
Moldovan territorial integrity and commenced peace negotiations. 163 In order to gain more 
control over Russian forces stationed in the region Yeltsin decided to replace the previous 
Commander-In-Chief with the Major General Alexander Lebed, the battalion Commander in the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it appeared that Lebed not only less subordinate than 
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the previous Commander but was also a  hardline communist and the biggest opponent of the 
reformist policy of Yeltsin. While performing his duties Lebed very often provoked the Moldovan 
government by calling its leaders “Moldovan Fasists”. He also said that President Mircea Snegur 
was “negotiating with Yeltsin only in order to mislead public opinion, while in reality (he was) 
preparing for war.”164 Increasingly unauthorized actions of individual 14th Army units were 
reported in the summer 1992 in what was perceived as if the Kremlin was losing complete 
control over the Russian forces. “Orders were not executed, individual units broke away and 
solders, paid more by the separatists than by the Russian state, entered into their militia.”165 
 
 
4. The Peace negotiations 
 
In response to losing control over developments in Transnistria Yeltsin decided to 
intervene to halt the conflict in July 1992.  The decision was driven mostly by Yeltsin’s desire to 
stabilize the domestic conflict in Russia where his reforms came under attack by the hardline 
communist camp and extreme nationalists. For instance, the Congress of People’s Deputies - the 
supreme organ of power in the Federation dominated by Yeltsin opponents, was systematically 
reducing presidential powers, including the power of appointing of administrative offices.166    
Thus, in order to please the opposition Yeltsin decided to commence the peace 
                                                 
164 Bohdan Nahaylo, National Ferment in Moldova, RFE/RL Research Raport, vol 32, no. 20, 24 January 1988, 4. 
cited by: Smith Jr., Russia and Moldova: Developing Relations…, p.43. 
165 Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in the Time of Troubles, ( Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1996) cited 
in: Andrea Morike, The Military as a Political Actor in Russia: the Cases of Moldova and Georgia, (Kishinev: 
International Spector, 1998), p.122. 
166 Allen C. Lynch, “The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990’s “, The Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, vol 18, (2002), p.164. 
  49 
negotiations with Moldova that would eventually result in the proclamation of independence of 
the breakaway Transnistrian territory. Kishinev had proposed quadripartite talks with assistance 
from the Ukrainian and Romanian governments but the Russian side disagreed saying that the 
most effective negotiations would be between the Russian and Moldovan authorities. After a 
couple of days of negotiations, on 21, July the sides reached the solution that included: “ 
Implementing a cease-fire, creating a demarcation corridor between the forces, introducing the 
neutral peacekeeping forces, granting a political status to the left bank of the Dniester by the 
Moldovan parliament and ultimately scheduling the bilateral negotiations on withdrawing the 14th 
Army.”167 Russian representatives also promised to restore trade between the two countries that 
had been suspended by the Federation after the Moldovan declaration of independence.  
During the  implementation of the peace arrangements the most difficult part was the 
establishment of the peacekeeping forces. Kishinev insisted that the mission be made up of CIS 
and UN troops while Moscow preferred the peacekeeping forces to be constituted out of the 
Russian forces, meaning the 14th Army and only eventually Moldovan and Transnistrian soldiers. 
168 Russian agreed not to engage the 14th Army in the peacekeeping mission but instead to send 
some additional Russian troops to the region. Moldova agreed to this scenario and in  mid-July 
the peacekeeping mission that was composed of 3800 Russian, 1200 Moldovan and 1200 
Dniester solders was sent to the left bank.169 The Moldovan decision was very controversial. By 
agreeing to accept additional Russian troops as peacekeepers on its territory in practice the 
Moldovan government agreed to enlarge the Russian contingent stationed in the region and thus 
allowed the Russians to increase their control over the course of events in Transnistria. Later, 
during an interview President Snegur stated that sending Russian troops was the only chance to 
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form the peacekeeping mission because the UN organs did not agree to send troops to the region 
while the conflict was still ongoing. 170  
A couple of days after the deployment of the peacekeeping mission to the region the first 
complaints about its activities appeared. The Moldovan president asked the UN to send 
international observers because of “the rising doubts about the other side’s sincerity.” 171 The 
President claimed, for instance, that the peacekeeping forces allowed the formation of the 
independent institutions of the Transnistrian government and thus strengthened the secessionist 
movement. The promised negotiation regarding the withdrawal of 14th Army also did not bring 
the expected results. Every time the Moldovan foreign Minister wanted to commence the talks 
the Russian authorities postponed them. Finally Minister Kozyrev officially stated that the 
withdrawal of the Russian forces would only be possible when Moldova considered military 
cooperation within the CIS military structure. 172 To sum up, after the negotiation Moldova ended 
up having 3800 more Russian soldiers on its soil and the fully formed institutions of the 
secessionist government thanks to the deployed international peacekeeping mission. This 
situation definitely did not satisfy the Moldovan authorities. The Russian intervention into the 
conflict and the continual pro-DMR rhetoric from the Russian Duma convinced many leaders that 
the Russian Federation was intent on using the Transnistiran crisis as a way of exercising control 
over Moldovan domestic affairs.”173 
 
                                                 
170 Vladimir Socor, Moldovan President appeals to UN, RFE/RL Daily Report, vol. 1, no. 52,  3 August 1992, p.17. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Vladimir Socor, Moldova facing Russian Pressure, RFE/RL Research Raport, vol 1, no. 52,  15 December 1992, 
p.39. 
173 King,  The Moldovans. Romania…, p.198. 
  51 
5. Frozen Conflict
174
 
 
                    “The result of the Russian intervention was that Transnistria became effectively 
portioned form the rest of Moldova, the fighting cooled, and was replaced by a frozen 
conflict.”175 Although the fighting between the troops almost stopped neither Russia and 
Moldova nor Transnistria and Moldova reached any peace agreement. Moldova abandoned all 
hopes concerning the rapid withdrawal of the 14th Army after the Russian Minister of Defense, 
Pavel Grachev, stated “ the withdrawal of 14th Army from the Dniester area will only be possible 
when the conflict in the region is settled.”176 In DMR, on the other hand, Smirnof’s advisor Valeri 
Litskai (latter appointed the Foreign Minister) demanded the formation of a Federalist state 
consisting of three entities: the Republic of Moldova, the Soviet Republic of Transnistria and the 
Republic of Gagauz. President Snegur immediately rejected this proposal and stated that he 
would oppose any kind of the transformation of Moldova into the federative structure. He also 
added that he would oppose the creation of the sovereign Dniester state with its own army forces, 
borders, and security services and might only agree on the creation of    Dniester autonomy 
within the Moldovan state.177 
In February 1993 the presidents Yeltsin and Snegur met in the Kremlin to discuss the most 
burning questions in the relations between two countries. The meeting was considered to be the 
third round of negotiations for withdrawal of the Russian troops. During the talks Snegur 
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proposed the creation of a free trade zone in Bender, granting the DMR a special political status 
within the state, and complying with  international norms regarding the rights of minorities in the 
country. Both Russia and Transnistrian leaders did not agree to this proposal and demanded the 
formation of an independent Dniestrian army. Boris Yeltsin, when asked about the precise date of 
withdrawal of the Russian Army from Transnistria, proposed that part of the contingent might be 
disbanded, which would mean in practice the transfer of soldiers and their equipment to the 
Transnistrian Guard. In face of the lack of any agreement Moldova started to seek a helping hand 
in the adjacent neighborhood. On February 19, 1993 Moldova signed a Treaty with the Ukrainian 
government on cooperation between the national custom services in order to reduce the transit of 
goods to the DMR as well as to suppress the infiltration of the Russian mercenaries. In this way 
Ukraine tried to implement the plan of creating the kind of regional alliance that would serve as  
counterbalance to  Russian domination.178  
      Moscow’s reaction was harsh as usual. Russia punished Ukraine for making deals 
behind Russia’s back by voting on reclaiming  Sevastopol as Russian territory. It also turned 
against the government in Kishinev. Kremlin used trade barriers to make  exports to Russia from 
Moldova completely unprofitable.  As sales to Russia and other CIS countries dominated the 
Moldova economy, the financial stability of the country was completely dependent on the trade 
relations with Russia. In this case the government in Kishinev did not have much of a choice. In 
September, during the CIS countries meeting, both sides agreed that Moldova in return for lifting 
the trade restrictions on January 1, 1994, would sign the Agreement of Creation of CIS and thus 
became a full member of the organization without any restrictions.179 The Agreement entered into 
force on April 8, 1994. Moreover Moldova signed the CIS Human Rights Convention as well as 
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joined the economic cooperation board and the Committee of the Foreign Ministries CIS created 
to coordinate the common foreign policy of the CIS countries. 180 When news about the Snegur’s 
decision reached Kishinev protests broke out all over the century.  The pro-Romanian and pro-
European camps stated that “Russia will use the economy to enslave Moldova politically and as 
long as the occupational 14th Army stays in Moldova, we can make no arrangements with 
Russia.” 181 Reporters of BASA-press informed that around 200 people protested on the 
parliament square against Moldova’s entrance into CIS shouting slogans like “ The Parliament 
wants us to have an economic, political, social and cultural Gulag.”182 Yet, the protests of the 
Moldovan opposition were silenced for a while when in October the constitutional crisis in 
Moscow engaged the Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities. The crisis broke out when Yeltsin 
dissolved the main legislative body, the Congress of People’s Deputies, led by his mail opponent, 
Ruslan Chasbulatov. 183 In response, the Russian parliament impeached Boris Yeltsin and 
replaced him with the hardline communist, vice president Alexander Rutskoy. When on October 
3, 1993 the Russian Army, obedient to the old president, stormed the parliament building the 
DMR authorities came out against the Yeltsin leadership and promised armed support for 
Chasbulatov and Rutskoy.  Ten days later, after the arrests of the impeachment leaders, Yeltsin 
decided to tackle the rebellious DMR leadership. “The Russian Central Bank froze Transnistrian 
assets, stopped supplying rubles…and Defense Minister Grachev ordered the 14th Army, 
commander, General Alexander Lebed, to sever relations with the criminal DMR government, 
accusing its leadership of corruption and involvement in the illegal arms trade.”184 Although the 
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Moldovan leadership considered it to be the turning point in the Russian-Moldovan relations 
regarding the Transnistrian conflict, its happiness was premature. It proved to be a spontaneous 
reaction of Yeltsin that was very quickly explained by Kozyrev who said that “the Transnistria’ 
leadership attitude toward constitutional crisis in Moscow had nothing to do with the protection 
of the Russian national interests in the region.” 185  
  
 
6. The Russian- Moldovan Relations: Warming Up?  
 
In early 1994 the political climate in Kishinev had drastically changed. In February the 
Agrarian Democratic Party won in the parliamentary elections getting the majority of the seats in 
the parliament. This reformist communist organization backed the closer ties with the Russian 
Federation and other former Republics and was, accordingly, against close cooperation with 
Romania. Petru Lucinschi, Speaker of Moldovan Parliament, advocated Moldova’s entrance into 
CIS structures and intensification of economic cooperation, including the Free Trade Zone within 
the CIS territory. He was also a fervent proponent of the “proportional integration” which meant 
the simultaneous integration of Moldova with European and CIS structure.186 Lucinschi, on the 
other hand, strongly opposed the presence of the foreign troops on the Moldovan territory. 
Therefore, just after the elections, the Moldovan parliament adopted the neutrality clause (Article 
11) of 1994 Moldovan constitution that made foreign military presence on the Moldovan territory 
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illegal. 187 
Further improvement of Russian-Moldovan relations occurred with the results of the 
referendum on the future integration of the country with Romania. It turned out that the pro-
Romanian and anti-state position of the Popular Front was backed only by the small minority of 
population and over 95 percent of voters favored Moldova’s continuing independent statehood.188 
Moldova’s full accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States softened Russia’s attitude 
towards the demands of withdrawal of the 14th Army’s from the DMR. The shift in Russian 
policy was also a result of  pressure from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), which in July adopted a resolution disapproving Russian involvement the 
conflict.189 After two years of negotiation during the OSCE Budapest Summit on October 24, 
1994, Moldova and Russia signed the agreement that called for the Russian Army’s withdrawal 
within three years from the date of the entry into force of the agreement.190 Up to this moment the 
Russians had linked the withdrawal of the troops to a settlement on the final status of 
Transnistria. It was a first time when the Federation did not add any sine qua non condition to the 
settlement. However, in view of the future NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space, at the 
end of the year the Federation began to mention the maintenance of its forces in Moldova. 191The 
Russian Duma claimed  “since the document was the international agreement on Russian military 
forces, it needed to be ratified by the Russian parliament first.”192 The lower house, in turn, was 
overwhelmingly dominated by the hard-liner communists led by Chasbulatov, who would never 
agree on removing the Army without an agreement on the secession of DMR from the Republic 
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of Moldova. When the protests from Kishinev resounded Russian officials renamed and 
reorganized the 14th Army into “Operational Group of Russian Forces”(OGRF) and thus made 
the agreement with Moldova invalid. Disappointed Moldovan leaders in a last-ditch attempt to 
solve the Russian Army issue on November 24, 1994 ratified the new constitution. The Article 
111 of the document officially gave special autonomy status to the Transnistrian region and 
Gagauzia. 193 Thus Moldovans insisted that the removal of the Russian troops begin with the 
granting of autonomy to the DMR but the Russian parliament claimed that the agreement would 
come into force only after its ratification by the Congress of People’s Deputies.  
Yet Moscow knew that the maintenance of the large military formations was not only very 
costly, taking under consideration the current economic situation in the country, but also pointless 
to some degree, since the DMR was of declining strategic value.194 Moreover at the beginning of 
1995 the Transnistrian parliament passed the bill forbidding either withdrawing or decreasing the 
number of Russian soldiers stationed in the region. The case of Russian decision to withdraw the 
troops, all the assets including various kinds of equipment would be transferred to the DMR 
leadership. 195 Tired of nursing the breakaway region which many times showed a lack of loyalty 
to the presidential camp the Russian Defense Ministry Pavel Grachev issued a decree 
significantly reducing the numbers of troops stationed in the DMR. Yet, a week later, on April 26, 
1995, the Russian Duma passed a resolution forbidding the withdrawal of troops under the 
pretext of the threat of another outbreak of war in Moldova. 196 In this instance Yeltsin decided to 
outwit the opposition in the Russian legislature and appointed as new commander of the OGRF 
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Valerii Yevnevich who replaced the rebellious general Lebed. Loyal to the reformist camp 
Yevnevich quickly reduced the administrative personnel by over 45 percent and destroyed part of 
the military stockpiles. But this gesture toward the Moldovan authorities did not mean that 
Moscow accepted Kishenev’s conditions. In June, during the presidential meeting the head of the 
Russian state offered assistance in resolving the “ Transnistrian problem” in return for promise of 
establishing permanent Russian military bases in the country.197 Yeltsin made similar offer to the 
authorities of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia 198. At this time, the Duma was not indifferent to 
the presidential arrangements. On November 17, 1994 the Congress of People’s Deputies on the 
initiative of radical communists and nationalists (especially Vladimir Zirinovsky) passed a 
resolution proclaiming Moldova „a strategic sphere of Russian interests.“  This controversial 
decision was an answer to Moldova’s accession to the Council of Europe on July 13, 1995 and 
the “Partnership of Peace” which was a program of North Atlantic Treaty Organization aimed at 
creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe.  
The real shift in Russian foreign policy toward the “Near Abroad” came with the 
replacement of Minister Kozyrev by the Yevgeny Primakov. Although the new Minister was a 
proponent of protecting the Russian national interest in the region and strongly opposed  NATO’s 
expansion into the “ Near Abroad”, he was also an ardent supporter of using more diplomatic 
methods to advance national security.199According to the International Crisis Group report, 
Moscow “became less willing to bear the primary costs of CIS reintegration and pushed this to 
occur at different speeds within core of willing states, including via the Custom Union (Russia, 
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Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and later Tajikistan) and the Russian-Belarus Union.”200 The 
warming-up in Russia-Moldovan relations was also rooted in the outcome of the presidential 
elections in Moldova on November 31, 1996. In the second round of presidential elections the 
current President Mircea Snegur was defeated by the former head of the Agrarian Democratic 
Party and the speaker of Moldovan parliament, Petru Lucinschi. The newly elected President was 
very well known for his pro-Russian views and immediately after his victory  the analysts in 
Moscow anticipated that “ Lucinschi's victory could pave the way for the settlement of a 
secessionist rebellion by ethnic Russians in Moldova's industrial Dniester region.”201  
Thus in the middle of the year the Russian Foreign Minister initiated quadripartite talks, 
with the representatives of Russia, Moldova, OSCE and Ukraine,  on the memorandum entitled “ 
Bases for Normalization of relations between the Republic of Moldova and DMR.”202 The very 
short document, (only two pages long), contained almost all the previous arrangements regarding 
the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Yet, the sides could not agree on the final 
status of the breakaway region and the final draft of the agreement assumed that the parties 
“continue the establishment between them of state-legal relations.”203 Although the 
Normalization Act did not initiate the establishment of the new sovereign republic of Transnistria 
it allowed it to have some attributes of an independent state. For, example, in accordance with the 
Act Transnistria was able to conduct of its own foreign policy. Moreover the act introduced the 
concept of “ common state” which suggested the formation of the Moldovan Confederation with 
the independent entities within. Still performing his duties Snegur did not agree with the 
interpretation of the Act and did not sign the memorandum. Later, during the presidential 
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elections the matter of the Normalization Agreement became an important issue. The Communist 
and pro-Russian candidate Lucinschi claimed that Snegur did not sign the Act because of the 
pressure from the government in Bucharest that wanted to maintain the Transnistrian crisis as 
long as possible to set Kishinev against the Russian authorities. His view on that matter was 
confirmed during the Lucinschi’s October visit in Moscow. Through at that time only  a 
presidential candidate, he pledged that during his presidency Moldovan-Russian relations would 
be of highest priority. 204 However, after a couple of weeks it turned out that Snegur was not the 
only one who did not eventually agree on the content of memorandum. Yeltsin in the face of the 
upcoming presidential elections also did not support the arrangement included in the 
Normalization Act.  He wanted to please hardline communists and nationalists opposing any 
concessions regarding status of the DMR and presence of the Russian troops in Moldova. 205 
Russian-Moldovan cooperation over the next three years revolved around finding conflict 
resolution. In the middle of 1997 newly elected President Lucinschi and the head of Transnistria 
worked up a special annex to the 1996 memorandum that elaborated on all of the disputed 
points.206 On May 8, 1996, the representatives of the breakaway region and Moldova signed in 
Moscow the annex to the memorandum and the agreement itself under the auspices of Russian 
and Ukrainian governments. With the signing of the Normalization Act, “newspapers and wire 
services immediately reported that the Transnistrian conflict had been resolved.”207 
Unfortunately, that was not entirely true. In reality the memorandum did not resolve any of the 
most controversial issues. For example, the document did not resolve either the presence of  
Russian troops or the final status of the province. Both sides were only obligated to continue the 
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negotiations on a peaceful resolution within “ the structure of one consolidated state.”208  
At the same time the Russian authorities noticed that Moldova had retired from active 
participation in CIS activities, especially regarding military cooperation.  Further Moscow was 
alarmed by the news that post-Soviet countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova had 
met in Strasbourg to discuss the foundation of a new Organization for Democracy and Economic 
Development (GUAM).209 Although the official goal of establishing of  organization was to find 
“solutions for mainly two problems that were not tackled properly within the existing 
organization where all four countries were members – in the CIS:(…) cooperation on regional 
security and cooperation on energy”, GUAM was seen as a way of countering  Moscow’s 
influence in the region.210 Yeltsin not only worried that Russia would lose its dominant position 
in the area but was mostly afraid of American influence over “ the Near Abroad” as the GUAM’s 
founding was immediately supported by the United States government. In spite of the Russian 
deputy foreign Minister assurances that “there is no anti-Russian factor” in GUAM, the Russian 
president in order to improve Moldova Russia relations paid an unofficial visit to Kishinev. 
Allegedly during that meeting Yeltsin made Lucinschi an offer that in return for a reassurance 
that Moldova would not turn its back on Russia, the Kremlin might consider the withdrawal of 
the Russian Army from Transnistria. Unfortunately, taking under consideration the fact that the 
status of the Army did not change in any way, one can assume that presidents did not come to an 
agreement.   
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7. Economic Crisis 
 
 
In 1998, as a consequence of the fast deteriorating economic situation in Russia, for the 
first time the governments in Moscow and Kishinev focused more on the economic issues in 
interstate relations than on resolving the Dniestrian deadlock.  Trade between the countries had 
been regulated by the agreements signed during the Soviet period and the only time it had been 
disturbed was by the temporary export berriers imposed by Russians in order to influence the 
Moldovan policy-making process.  
Meanwhile, in Russia the economy suffered from declining productivity, an artificially 
high fixed exchange rate between the ruble and foreign currencies, and an enormous fiscal 
deficit.211 Consequently, at the beginning of the year,  nflation reached 84 percent, the biggest 
banks were being closed down and the government was forced to pay millions of rubles to settle 
with striking miners. In turn, the on-going economic crisis in Russia greatly influenced the 
already severe economic situation in Bessarabia. Since Moldova’s declaration of independence in 
1991, Russia had been the main investor in Moldova and the main supplier of the most strategic 
recourses like energy, oil, gas and other raw materials.212 Moreover, at that time, Russia 
accounted for “around 40 percent of the Moldova’s export and till the outbreak of the crisis the 
reciprocal trade was growing”.213  
In the face of the growing economic crisis in March 1998 Russia decided to take 
advantage of Moldova’s dependence on Russian resources and forced the weaker partner to sign 
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the bilateral “Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation (RF) and the 
Republic of Moldova” that was very unfavorable for Kishinev. 214 The agreement established the 
framework for Russian-Moldovan trade relations for the next ten years and set gas prices on a 
much higher level than the prices imposed on other post-Soviet states. For example, when 
Moldova had to pay 80 dollars per cubic meters for imported gas from the Federation, Belarus 
and Armenia paid only half of that. 215  Due to the ridiculously high prices for the gas provided by 
the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, the republic’s energy debt to Russia amounted to some 215 
million dollars, or roughly 11 percent of Moldova’s GDP.216 Kishinev’s inability to pay for the 
gas deliveries forced Russia to halve the supply on July, 1, 1998. When Gazprom threatened a 
complete cutoff in August Moldova “agreed to transfer to Gazprom 90 million dollars in 
government bonds, with an annual interest rate of 7.5 percent, by the end of 1999.”217 To be able 
to pay off the Gazprom debt the Moldovan leadership decided to introduce the system of 
“temporary power cuts” till the end of the year. This decision aroused much controversy among 
the Moldovan populations, as around half of the Gazprom debt was DMR’s share. Yet, Kishinev 
was reluctant to let Tiraspol accept responsibility for its share of the debt to Gazprom, “viewing 
this as a further step in recognizing Transnistria’s sovereignty.”218 
The economic turmoil in both countries did not obstruct moving to the next stage of the 
Transnistrian conflict resolution. “With the active support of Russian Prime Minister Victor 
Chernomyrdin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma Lucinschi and Smirnof concluded an 
agreement in Odessa in March 1998 that called for a reduction in the number of peacekeeping 
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forces and the re-building of the bridges that were destroyed or damaged during the fighting in 
1992 and 1993.”219 Additionally, at this  meeting the Russian Defense Minister, Igor Sergeev, 
made the removal of the Russian troops one of the conditions to the accomplishment of a final 
settlement of the Dniestrian conflict.  
However, at the end of the decade, Russian-Moldovan relations significantly deteriorated. 
Moldovan authorities expressed their dissatisfaction with the course of  cooperation with Russia 
during the CIS meeting by stating a willingness of resigning from membership in the 
organization.  At the same time it tried to develop closer relations with one of its neighbors - 
Romania. In order to do so the representatives of both countries met in Bucharest to discuss the 
extension of economic cooperation. There were two main reasons why Moldova stopped 
considering Russia as its most important partner. First of all, Moldova was tired of the endless 
talks and negotiations on withdrawal of Russian forces from DMR without any visible results. 
Moldovan authorities eventually understood that this decision was being constantly postponed 
only in order to retain decisive influence over the weaker country and did not really depend on 
the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Secondly, the consequences of the Russian crisis 
helped them to realize that the Moldovan economic situation was completely dependent on 
Russia’s policy. Therefore, when Gazprom periodically reduced deliveries and threatened on 
occasion to cut off supplies entirely the Moldovan leadership started to look for international 
partners in the West. 
The shift in the Moldovan attitude toward its major partner was also noticed by the 
Russian authorities. Firstly Moscow  attempted to threaten the leaders in Kishinev by  adopting 
the resolution in March proclaiming Transnistira  “sphere of the Russian strategic interest.”220 
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When this strategy did not bring the expected results, the Kremlin decided to implement the more 
diplomatic “Plan B.” Namely , in November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul Russia 
eventually agreed on a declaration to remove all the army forces from Moldovan Republic by the 
end of 2002. 221 Yeltsin also stated that all categories of arms and equipment would not be 
transferred to the Transnistrian Guard but were to be destroyed or withdrawn by the end of 2001. 
It is important to note that, unlike the previous 1994 declaration on removal of the 14th Army, this 
time the agreement was reached without any conditions and without any linkage to resolving 
Transnistria’s status.222 Unfortunately that was the only difference between those two agreements. 
Similarly to the previous declaration, the Istanbul settlement did not resolve the issue and as it 
will be presented in the next chapter the presence of the Russian army would also be the main 
issue in the Russian-Moldovan relations in the XXI century.   
Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the size of the Russian troops decreased 
considerably, from 9250 in 1992 to 2600 in 1999. Also significant amount of military equipment 
was destroyed.223 Moreover, under the new Commander Evnevich the forces played a more 
conciliatory role and there was no more rhetoric about Moldovan fascists or orchestrated 
genocide, as occurred under the command of General Lebied. 224 According to Charles King, 
these developments were consequence of Moscow’s growing dissatisfaction with tragic economic 
situation in DMR and enormous Gazprom debt. Moreover, the Kremlin was unsatisfied with the 
fact that Trasnistria seemed to be an creation that mostly served the economic interests of its 
leaders.225  Not without effect was the strong support of the DMR leadership for the Yeltsin 
opposition during the 1991 and 1993 coups in Moscow. Therefore at the end of the decade the 
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Yeltsin leadership had little reason to associate itself with the Dniestrian authorities and 
deteriorate the relation with Moldova by providing assistance to the rebellious region.  
By the late 1990s the political atmosphere in Kishinev also changed, which brought a new 
perspective to Russian-Moldovan relations in the XXI century. The Moldovan population was no 
longer so optimistic about the formation of the new state and no one spoke about possible 
reunification with Romania. Moreover the newly elected President Lucinschi was a very fervent 
proponent of close cooperation with Federation and opposed any symptoms of nationalism in 
Moldovan politics. 226 All of this set up excellent conditions for the final resolution of 
Transnistrian conflict and for intensifying cooperation with Russia.  
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Chapter III 
The Voronin Era. Moldovan-Russian Relations in the 
First Decade of XXI Century 
 
1. Putin’s rise to Power 
 
Unexpectedly, the year 2000 was marked by the significant changes on the Russian 
political scene and consequently a shift in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. On 31 December Boris 
Yeltsin made a New Year’s address live on the Russian television in which he resigned as a 
Russian president and nominated Vladimir Putin, who was supposed to serve as an acting 
president up until the presidential elections due to take place on 26 March 2000.227 President 
Yeltsin had taken the entire world by surprise.  He  had not only resigned half a year before 
presidential elections but he nominated a little- known high-ranking KGB officer a new head of a 
state. Yeltsin praised Putin as the best man to replace him: “Why hold on to power for another six 
months, when the country has a strong person, fit to be president, with whom practically all 
Russians link their hopes for the future today? Why should I stand in his way? Why wait for 
another six months?”228  In the March election the incumbent Putin won in the first round with 
about 53 percent of all votes. One of the reasons why he gained such a political popularity and 
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won over his greatest opponent Gennady Zyuganov was his hard line stance on the war in 
Chechnya. Just a month before the election Russian troops captured Grozny, the capital of the 
breakaway region , and thus ended over five-months of fighting. This was  widely perceived to be 
the first political victory of Putin.  
Right after the appointment of the new President, Putin moved to reforming the Russian 
policy-making organs as well as reevaluating the policy toward both, the West and “the Near 
Abroad”. He decided to create the new strategic concept, placing “the CIS member states on the 
top of Russian foreign policy priorities, seeing them as strategic partners and desiring the 
integration of the CIS with Russia, in particular in the economic and security spheres.” 229 
Therefore the Republic of Moldova not only remained  in the sphere of the Russian vital interests 
but also became an important international partner.   
Putin’s early presidency was characterized by political pragmatism. Moscow resigned 
from the policy of the full CIS integration in favor of securing the bilateral agreements in order to 
ensure its influence. 230 By ensuring influence in Moldova Russia hoped to slow down Kishinev’s 
integration process with the European Union and NATO. Therefore in June 2000 Putin’s 
government established special committee headed by Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, to 
coordinate the future negotiations of Transnistrian conflict.  One month later the committee 
presented a draft agreement on the DMR problem with the proposal of creating a Moldovan 
confederation. According to the proposal the Transnistrian Republic would have had an equal 
status with Moldova within the confederation in order to allow it to greatly influence Moldovan 
policy-making. This proposition served perfectly Russian interest because enabled Transniestira 
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to have a decisive vote in Kishinev guaranteed a continuing, and direct, Russian influence in 
Bessarabian politics.  “Under this draft each side would be allowed to maintain its own 
constitution, legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, flag, coat of arms, and national 
anthem.“231 Additionally, the Russian Foreign Minister offered to increase the number of Russian 
peacekeepers to 26000 (with simultaneous withdrawal of the OGRF troops), allow Ukrainian and 
OSCE observers but, on no condition, to involve non-CIS troops in the mission.232 However, both 
Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities opposed the implementation of the agreement. The DMR 
leadership did not want to accept the removal of any Russian troops from the region while 
Moldova did not want to allow the “confederalization” of the country as it would in fact mean the 
formation of the independent Transnistrian state.  
Meanwhile Moldova itself was rocked by the serious political crisis that lasted from the 
end of 1999 till the parliamentary elections in 2001. The political gridlock was rooted in 
President Lucinschi’s efforts to strengthen his powers by transforming the country into the 
presidential republic. By calling for the referendum on the amendment to the constitution 
Lucinschi commenced a long-lasting war with the Moldovan Parliament. The parliamentary 
leaders, both non-Communists from the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms and Communists 
from The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), charged the current head of 
state with responsibility for destabilizing the country, acting for his own interests, and “dictatorial 
ambitions”. The parliament started to debate a reform of the constitution aimed at weakening the 
presidential power and unexpectedly, on 5 July 2000, the lower house passed three constitutional 
amendments strengthening the power of the parliament and making Moldova a parliamentary 
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republic in line with a “Westernized model”. 233 Under the new law the new president would be 
elected by the three-fifths of the vote in the lower house, not in  direct elections. The communist 
representatives in the parliament who voted in favor of electing the president by parliament 
asserted that this change in the constitution would lead the country “ in the direction of a true 
parliamentary republic and forestall the creation of a semi-autocratic regime.”234 In practice, the 
changes in the constitution allowed the major parties to elect as president its own leaders and thus 
in the next parliamentary elections of 2001 to take over important institutions.  
The political crisis and the upcoming parliamentary elections proved to be a great 
opportunity for the increasingly popular, Communist and pro-Russian Party, and its leader 
Vladimir Voronin. That, in turn, was a great chance for Russian authorities to maintain influence 
over Moldovan politics through a Communist politician loyal to Moscow. Indeed, during the 
election campaign in January 2001, Vladimir Voronin stressed the need for close cooperation 
with the Kremlin and the CIS member states and signaled his willingness to make the Russian 
language the second official language of the republic. 235 The results of the parliamentary 
elections that were held on 25 February  2001 surprised everyone, even the Moldovans 
themselves. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova won the elections with an 
overwhelming constitutional majority in the parliament and thus, gained control over the 
presidential elections. 236 Hence, ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
announcement of  the existence of an independent Moldovan state, a majority of Moldovan voters 
opted for home-coming to power of the main Communist leaders. According to Paul D. Quinlan, 
a specialist at  the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, the main catalysts of the 
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communists’ victory in 2001 elections were “the seemingly inevitable plummeting of the 
economy and the resulting penurious living standards with little hope for a change.”237 In early 
April, the newly elected lower house without any trouble selected the Communist leader Voronin 
as the new president of Moldova. The country became one of the few remaining Communist, pro-
Russian states and henceforth Moscow had a good reason to expect  close cooperation with 
Kishinev. 238  
 
2. Moldovan Communists rise to power 
 
 
Some scholars argued that the victory of the Communists would not have been possible 
without strong Russian support and influence.239 How did Russia affect the Moldovan elections? 
One of the ways in which Russia could have had influenced the Moldovan voters was through the 
public media. In accordance with survey conducted by the Eurasia Foundation of European 
Integration, “when it comes to confidence in media, the majority of respondents – 67.7 percent 
tended to have confidence in Russian TV channels.”240 In that case more then a half of the 
population received information about Moldovan, Russian and global politics from  Russian 
sources.  
 The efforts Russia put in order to influence the Moldovan elections should not be 
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surprising, taking under consideration the profits Moscow gained with the triumph of 
Communists in Moldova. The victory of PCRM in the parliamentary elections and the selection 
of the first secretary of the Communist Party, Voronin, as head of the state offered the Kremlin a 
chance to pursue its own idea for resolving the Transniestrian conflict and to control the political 
decisions made in Kishinev. In early 2001 the new leadership declared that for now on Moldova 
would be a modern socialist country,  “a European Cuba” and Voronin assured that the country’s 
foreign policy would “undergo some modifications”. What this meant in practice was turning 
toward the East. 241 Indeed, already ten days after the elections Voronin went to Moscow in order 
to assured  the Kremlin that “Russia has always been, is, and will be the strategic partner in all 
areas, including joint actions on the international stage.”242 During this visit Putin also stressed 
Russian willingness of the close cooperation by saying that both countries would “work to sustain 
their economic links in order to reach together the targets that Moldova has set for itself.”243 
In November 2001, just a few months after an appointment of the new president, the 
Russian-Moldovan Friendship and Co-operation Treaty was signed. This document provided the 
necessary framework for the bilateral relations and stipulated Moscow as the guarantor of  
Moldova’s integrity.244 Moreover, under the Treaty’s provisions Russia became the major 
mediator and coordinator in a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.  The Treaty also 
provided for cooperation on tax, financial, monetary, trade, and customs policies. 245 Yet 
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according to Graeme P. Herd the whole treaty was not made fully public. 246 The document 
showed that the Moldova’s Gazprom debts, including the DMR’s amount (around 1 billion 
dollars), would be paid by Kishinev. 247 Even more importantly the Treaty included the provision 
that the Russian language would play an important role within Moldovan society and therefore 
Kuishinev would make an effort to provide all necessary conditions for the Russian language 
instruction in Moldovan primary and secondary schools.248 Additionally to the document 
described above the communist-dominated parliament has ratified by majority of votes the 
intergovernmental agreement on Russian-Moldovan military cooperation that had been signed 
already in 1997. The ratified document provided for cooperation in gathering information, 
exchange of visits and experience as well as conduct of joint research projects, exercises and 
exchange of cadets. 249 
As one can clearly see there had never been such a warm atmosphere in  Russian-
Moldovan relations as after the victory of PCMR. In addition to the signed bilateral agreements 
the pro-Russian attitude of the Moldovan government was noticeable also in new legislation on 
domestic affairs passed by the lower house. In August the Communist leadership decided to 
introduce the Russian language as  an obligatory subject in all Moldovan schools and to change 
the subject previously called “the History of Romanians” to “History of Moldova.” 250  The 
Communists’ stance on the language issue was expressed by Voronin during his second visit in 
Moscow when he said that he would prefer all Moldovans to speak Russian.251 This statement 
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and the new language law itself stirred up significant opposition among the non-communist 
politicians as well as ordinary Moldovan citizens. It was manifested by mass street rallies during 
which the protestors requested the dismissal of the Communist government and asked for the new 
parliamentary elections. 252 
Even though the economic and politician situation in Moldova was extremely tense the 
Communist leadership believed that the pro-Russian approach and the  decisions associated with 
it would help to settle the Transniestrian problem and, even more importantly, lead to preferential 
treatment in Russia - Moldova trade. As presented in the previous chapter “Russia traditionally 
represented the largest market for Moldovan goods and at the same time the biggest, if not only, 
energy supplier.”253 In 2000 Moldova’s economic dependence on Russia even deepened as the 
reciprocal trade for the previous two years had increased nearly six times and was estimated at 
more than 534 million dollars in 2000.254  Thus, in order to negotiate advantageous economic 
agreements at the end of 2001 year the Moldovan leadership announced  willingness to join an 
economic union with Belarus and Russia. The Commonwealth of Belarus and Russia, as it was 
initially called, was created in April 1996 in order to provide a full political, economic, and social 
integration of the two countries. Kishinev’s decision to join the economic structure of the 
organization would mean in practice a return to the situation from fifteen years earlier, when 
Moldova was still a part of the Soviet Union.      
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3. A Great Disappointment 
 
 
In spite of the efforts Voronin and his government put into the strengthening of ties with 
Russia, nothing went the way the Communist had hoped. The signing of the Treaty of Friendship 
and Co-operation and the Moldovan proposal to join the economic union with Russia and Belarus 
did not encourage Moscow to provide substantial economic assistance to Moldova, especially 
when the prices for gas deliveries were concerned. During the meeting of Moldovan Prime 
Minister Vesile Tarlev and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov at the beginning of 2002 the 
latter clearly stressed that Moscow was not willing to help Kishinev to its own disadvantage and 
was going to keep gas prices of the same level. 255   The Prime Minister also stated that high level 
of taxes on imports of sugar, alcohol and tobacco would not change in the near future which, in 
turn, resulted in a drop of Moldova’s sugar exports by over 90 percent. 256 At the same time 
Russian politicians emphasized that that the volume of Russian investment in Bessarabia was 
systematically growing and the import of the Moldovan wine amounted to almost 80 percent of 
the total volume of the imported wine.257 However Kishinev was not satisfied with the results of 
talks and a few days latter Voronin renounced Moldova’s intended integration with the Belarus-
Russian State Union by saying that Moldova had no interest in joining the organization.258 
Similarly, Moscow did not meet the high expectations of Moldovan authorities regarding 
its role in the settlement of Transnistrian conflict. Voronin has hoped that the pro-Russian stance 
                                                 
255 Alexander Isaev, Rossia - Moldova: Sozdany Predposylki dlia Razvitia Ekonomicheskikh 
Sviazei (Kishinev: NM, 22 November 2001). 
256 Skvortova, Country Report Moldova… . 
257 Ibid.  
258 Lech Wojciechowski, “Mołdawia”in: Rocznik Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 2001-2002 (Warsaw: ISP PAN 
, 2003) p.211. 
  75 
and the new policy of Communist government would convince Moscow to support Moldova in 
the clash with Smirnof and his entourage. It did not really happen. When during the talks on 
solving the conflict the DMR leadership refused to make any concessions in negotiations, 
Moldova was forced to walk out and apply necessary economic sanctions. Those sanctions 
included the introduction of the new custom stamps with the WTO standard’s marks that were not 
provided to breakaway region. Thus Transnistria’s exports came under Kishinev’s control. 259 At 
the same time Voronin asked for Russian support but Putin, although he refused to recognize the 
old Transnistrian seals, did not fully back up Voronin and kept subsidizing gas being sold to 
Smirnof government. Additionally, at the end of October 2002 the Speaker of Russian Duma, 
Gennady Selezniov, publicly announced that the Kremlin would not be able to meet the deadlines 
for withdrawing its troops from the region that were agreed on the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 
1999.260 Instead Russia requested from the OSCE’s an  extension of the deadline to the end of 
2003. 
The course of events described above and the lack of economic privileges for Moldova in 
trade with Russia significantly souredrelation between the two states. Along with resigning from 
joining the State Union of Belarus and Russia, the Moldovan government slowly backed away 
from the concession on the Russian language.  In March 2002 the Moldovan Constitutional Court 
ruled the new language laws unconstitutional and declared that the publication of official 
documents in Russian was against the state law. More importantly, the Moldovan leadership re-
evaluated its relations with the West and expressed its willingness to strengthen cooperation with 
European countries and Western international organizations like the European Union and NATO. 
At the end of 2002 the Moldovan Prime Minister Tarlev stressed that Moldova wished for deeper 
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integration with the European structures. The Moldovan parliament also adopted “the program 
for the social and economic development of Moldova to 2005, which gave the highest priority to 
the country’s participation in the European integration processes.”261 Furthermore, in December 
2002, Vladimir Voronin called into being the National Commission for European Integration that 
was responsible for elaborating the EU integration strategy and intensifying the co-operation 
between various government institutions in this area.262  
 
 
4. “The Kozak Memorandum” 
 
 
Is it fairly clear that the Moldovan Communist Party and its leader were caught trying to 
balance stronger tendencies toward European organization with a continued pro-Russian stance. 
Moscow was not indifferent to Moldova’s increasing European aspirations. At the beginning of 
2003 the General Staff in Moscow held back the planned withdrawal of the Russian troops from 
Transnistria, which surprised not only Moldova but all sides involved in the negotiations. In 
response to those developments Voronin rushed to Moscow in order to request the renewal of 
negotiations on the matter of Russian forces in the DMR and the final settlement of the conflict. 
After a visit to Moscow on February 9, 2003 the Moldovan president proposed the draft of the 
new constitution that would introduce the new Moldovan political identity characterized by a 
union of partially self-governing states that would, in turn, satisfy all of the interested sides - 
DMR, Moldova and Russia. Greame P Herd, researcher of the Defense Academy of the United 
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Kingdom, explained Voronin’s move by saying that “This initiative was President Voronin’s 
contribution to a political settlement based on federal principles and appears to operate on the 
logic of “ You have the power, we have the control.”263 In response Putin sent to Kishinev Dimitri 
Kozak, the deputy head of the presidential administration, as an advisor to consult in the 
preparation of the constitution’s draft and prepare the special guideline of the basic principles for 
state structures that would lead the drafting. 264 This special guideline, latter called Kozak 
Memorandum (Also Kozak Plan), turned out to be another bone of contention in the Russian-
Moldovan relations. In the summer of 2003 Putin’s specialist without assistance from the OSCE 
co-mediators, commenced trilateral talks between Kishinev, Tiraspol and Moscow regarding the 
future status of the “common state”.  The main goal of the Russian diplomacy was to reach a 
constitutional agreement, under which the DMR would remain a separate federal entity within the 
greater Moldovan state, thus maintaining Moscow’s influence in Moldovan domestic affairs and 
preventing its involvement in European structures.265 In July 2003 the head of the Russian 
Presidential administration asked Moldova to present the first draft of the constitution in order to 
included the Kremlin’s amendments. Two months latter Kozak returned to Kishinev with an 
elaborated draft that included a proposal of creation of the asymmetrical federation (quasi 
confederation) with two separate entities, Moldova and Transnistria, that would have their own 
constitutions, executive, legislative and judicial bodies, budget, taxes and state property.266 
Surprisingly the answer of Moldovan authorities was positive and it was Smirnof who did not 
accept Moscow’s proposal. DMR authorities felt that this solution would not allow them eventual 
separation from Moldova and the proposed neutrality of the state would not guarantee the future 
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presence of the Russian army on Transniestrian territory. Under those circumstances Dimitri 
Kozak returned to Moscow without any signed documents. Yet, unexpectedly, Moscow decided 
to amend the elaborated memorandum. On November 14, 2003 Minister Kozak handed to 
Ambassador William Hill of the OSCE Mission in Kishinev the ready-made “Memorandum on 
the Basic Principles for the State Structure of the United State in Moldova” and thus made the 
document public. 267 On the day later the memorandum was presented to the all concerned parties 
and on November 25 officially signed by the Russian President.268 The current plan established 
the asymmetrical federation that at this time would have consisted of three entities: historical 
Moldova with majority population of Moldovan decent, the Moldovan Dniestr Republic and 
Gagauzian Republic, all of which would have its own executive, legislative and judiciary bodies 
as well as separate budgets. Moreover there were supposed to be establish federal institutions that 
would correspond to the local ones. Even more importantly, according to the proposed draft, the 
Transnistrian minority would basically be given veto power vote in the two-chambered federal 
Parliament on most of the significant issues.269  For instance, in the federal 26-seat upper house 
the DMR would have 9 senators, Gagauzia 4 and Bessarabia 13, which would signified that in 
case of the voting on crucial issues historical Moldova would not be able to reach the required 
approval by 75 percent, even with the support of the Gagauzia’s representatives.270 The DMR and 
Gagauzia would also have an large influence on the makeup of the federal government “ as the 
prime minister would require upper house confirmation and the two first deputies would be 
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appointed with agreement of the two regional parliaments.”271 But this was not the end of the 
provisions threatening the Moldovan position within the planned federation. The most important 
problems, the stationing of the Russian troops in DMW and the status of Russian language, were 
also settled by Kozak in favor of the separatist territory. Although initially the Memorandum 
included the provision that the Federation of Moldova would be a neutral, demilitarized country 
and would not maintain its own army, the document did not refer to the presence of the Russian 
army. The day after releasing the document Smirnof demanded the inclusion to the memorandum 
that Russian would be the state official language of the entire territory and that the Russian 
peacekeeping forces would be present in DMR for the next 30 years.272 Voronin, who at that time 
was sure that his Russian stance would lead to the replacement of the current Transnistrian 
leadership, was taken by surprise by the Russian answers to Smirnof’s demands.273 The Russian 
Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, during the official meeting with DMR leader guaranteed that 
Russian troops would be present up until the 2024 and that the next draft of the memorandum 
would include  a provision on the Russian language to become the second official language in the 
future Moldovan state. 274  
 The international players, so far actively involved in the peace process in the region, were 
deeply surprised by such a trajectory. They were not only excluded from the work on the draft but 
first and foremost, they were not even informed that such negotiations were taking place. The 
OSCE and Ukrainian co-mediators eventually found out about the three-sided consultations on 
the new constitutions from the DMR leadership that, unsatisfied with the current draft, purposely 
leaked the information to the OSCE representatives and insisted on commencing five-sided talks 
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as in previous years. 275 After the news on the secret talks reached the co-mediators they 
immediately asked to join the negotiations and to be allowed to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
access the prevailing results of negotiations. Moscow firmly refused.  This and the fact that the 
Russian proposal included many provisions unacceptable for the government in Kishinev led to 
the rise of a strong opposition to the Kozak Memorandum from the European, OSCE and 
American administrations. They argued that under such conditions the DMR would have a 
blocking majority in the federal government while in the regional institutions would exercise a 
total willfulness. Thus, right after the document was made public the representatives of the 
various Western countries and organizations scheduled urgent meetings with the Moldovan 
president who, at that time still had a decisive power within the Moldovan state.  
At first Kishinev’s reaction to the proposed draft was positive. Voronin argued that 
although some regulations would have to be reevaluated the benefits of the incorporated new 
constitution absolutely overweighted the chance of a flare-up of  conflict in the region.276 The 
Russian plan of the “common state” was actually initiated by the Moldovan president who 
dreamed to be the one bringing peace to the region and thus he wanted to carry through the 
negotiations at all costs. 277Nevertheless the  President immediately found himself under the 
domestic and foreign pressure not to sign the proposed draft. At the beginning of November 2003 
the chairman of OSCE, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, met with Voronin and strongly encouraged the 
Moldovan politician to reject the “asymmetrical federation’ plan pointing out that the Russian 
proposal was an attempt “to impose a distorted political and economic system on a fragmented 
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country” in order to cement Russian domination of Moldova.278 Additionally, almost all of the 
members of NATO and EU as well as United States rejected the plan by stating that the 
implemented new constitution would prevent Moldova from cooperating independently  with 
Western states and endangered the possibility for the country to ever become the member of the 
European Union.279 
Eventually, Voronin backed away from the agreement at the last minute. The plan was due 
to be signed on November 25, 2003. Minister Kozak arrived in the Moldovan capital a day earlier 
for the ceremony but President Voronin called off the meeting a couple of hours before its 
planned commencement.  What made Vornonin decide to reject the plan? Opinions are divided.280 
In numerous interviews he claimed that the reason he did not accept the proposal was that the 
settlement allowed Russian troops to be stationed in the Republic for next 20 years.281 However, 
Matthew Crandall in his article, “Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: The Transnistrian 
Effect” argued that “given the fact that Voronin initialed the agreement previously, it is plausible 
that without the fierce international opposition an agreement would have been reached” and 
Kishinev was disposed to accept Russian domination.282 John Lowenhardt from the Clindael 
Institute shared this view and claimed that the pressure from EU, USA and OSCE and the fear of 
the repetition of the “Georgian scenario” had play the major role in Voronin’s decision. 283  
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5. The Diplomatic Downturn 
 
 
Regardless of the reasons, the consequences of that decision were easy to predict. Russia 
failed to meet the deadline for withdrawing its troops from DMR, which had been settled earlier 
during the 2002 OSCE meeting. The Transnistrian leaders at first did not want to accept 
Moldovan rejection of the plan and stated that they “do not renounce the Kozak Memorandum 
and are ready to sign it even tomorrow.”284 Therefore, in January 2004, the three sides of the 
negotiations, this time along with the representatives of OSCE and Ukraine, met in Sofia in order 
to work on amendments to the current proposal. Moldovan experts presented the mediators with 
the new draft called “ Declaration of the basic principles of a State Structure of the Republic of 
Moldova.” that significantly decreased the Transniestrian stranglehold on the federation’s politics 
while at the same time continued to provide it with a blocking majority in the Federation’s upper 
house.285 However, Smirnof insisted on signing the Kozak Memorandum in its original version 
proposed by the Russian side. Tiraspol declared that if Kishinev refused to accept Kozak 
Memorandum, for reasons known only for Moldovan side, the DMR had its own draft of a new 
constitution that included the confederation of two states that would have equal status within the 
country.286 This proposal meant de facto the end of the negotiations on “the asymmetrical 
federation” as none of the sides wanted to agree on this settlement.  
Meanwhile Moscow had been showing its discontent with Moldova’s attitude. Dimitrij 
Kozak accused Voronin of lack of political courage and being unreliable while Putin canceled 
                                                 
284 Jan Maksymiuk, Analisis: Transnister wants Talks on ‘Federal System’ with Moldova, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, accessed online 17 September 2012, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/53bc0d6b-d61b-49bb-8f7a-
e563715de8b9.html 
285 B.a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria..., p.26. 
286 B.a., Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria..., p.26. 
  83 
planed official visit to the Moldovan capital.287 The growing criticism from the OSCE and UE 
representatives regarding the presence of Russian troops on DMR territory just added fuel to the 
fire. Russian relations with both the western organizations as well as with Moldova, significantly 
worsened. On the one hand Foreign Minister Ivanov criticized the OSCE for undermining a 
potential settlement of the conflict and refused to continue five-sided negotiations. On the other 
hand in 2004 Moscow did not invite Kishinev to join the CIS Common Economic Area at the 
Yalta summit, which was a big surprise for the Moldovan government taking under consideration 
that it expressed a desire to join the project already in 2001.288 
Yet, the worst moment for the Russian-Moldovan relations came with the breaking off of 
the Tiraspol-Kishinev talks in July 2004. The heat-up in the conflict was due to the DMR’s 
harassment of the Moldovan language school that used non-Cyrillic script.289 The authorities 
closed the schools, removed all the equipment and transferred all the students to Cyrillic-script 
schools in different towns by claiming that the Moldovan institutions violated Transnistrian law, 
which required schools to use Cyrillic alphabet.290 Additionally, within a few weeks, authorities 
in Tiraspol prohibited the Moldovan farmers from to access their fields in Transnistrian 
territory.291 Such an anti-Moldovan attitude raised an enormous objection in Kishinev. Yet the 
Kremlin, which was always very careful in backing any of sides, this time definitely supported 
Smirnoff. When Kishinev responded to the dispute with the suspension of the custom service to 
Transniestrian enterprises that were not officially registered in Kishinev and canceled all the 
privileges of DMR businesses, the Russian Foreign Ministry along with the DMR leader called 
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this measure an economic blockade.292 Moldova was clearly displeased. In December 2004, 
Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan gave an interview to Latvian media where he stated 
that“ 1500 Russian troops in Transnistria is a military occupation.”293 At the same time a similar 
statement was made by President Voronin himself who furthermore declared that from now on 
the main aim of Moldovan foreign policy was going to be the strengthening of co-operation with 
the EU that would enable future membership in the organization.  Russia reacted immediately. At 
the end of 2004  the Russian Ambassador to Moldova, Nikolai Ryabov, explicitly threatened the 
Republic by saying that too close relations with European partners would have tragic 
consequences for the fate of the country. 294  
 
 
 6. Economic Blackmail 
 
 
Indeed, when Russia began to carry out its threat and imposed economic sanctions on 
Moldovan products, the country’s economy significantly declined.  Imposition of sanctions had 
already turned out to be an effective tool as in the case of forcing Moldova into the CIS in 1994 
and thus became “an established instrument of the country’s increasingly muscular foreign 
policy.”295 In March 2005 the Russian Ambassador announced that “The Russian government is 
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weighing a variety of economic sanctions that could be imposed against Moldova in retaliation 
for what it considers unfriendly actions by the former Soviet republic.”296 By unfriendly actions 
the politician meant  Kishinev’s political decisions as a result of the “school crisis”. According to 
Interfax News, Moscow at first considered an embargo on alcohol and tabacco products, doubling 
the prices on imported energy supplies and introducing  new regulations regarding entry visas for 
Moldovan citizens.297 In fact the Russian government on 18  April 2005 began with the embargo 
of Moldovan meat under a veil of opinion of the experts that “Moldovan meat unfits the 
qualitative veterinary and sanitary security standards compared with the meat of Ukraine, a 
country which holds modern meat processing facilities.”298 However, Moscow soon found out 
that this sanction would not hit the Moldovans as much as they previously expected because  
domestic demand for the product was growing constantly and the exported product covered the 
requisition of the domestic market. Therefore, Russia moved to the next stage of economic 
blockade and a month later it decided to hit the most important industries in Moldova, 
agricultural products and winemaking. Especially the banning of the export of the latter had a 
great impact on the condition of the Moldovan economy as in  2005 the wine export generated 
25% of the countries GDP with Russia as the main export market accounting for almost 85% of 
the total export.299  The official reason for the ban was the lack of the quality control. At the 
beginning of December 2005 the exporters of the agricultural products and winemakers informed 
that As in result of the Russian boycott they had lost from 40% to 80% of their yearly incomes.300 
However it was noteworthy after a while  the embargo hit mostly the Russian entrepreneurs  as 
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the winemaking industry was dominated by businessmen of Russian desent. Another outcome of 
the  economic embargo, surely not intended by the Kremlin authorities,  was strengthening 
business links between producers from Moldova and Romania. 
 That was not the end of the economic blackmail though. In Autumn 2005 Moscow 
pressured Kishinev by using what can be called the "energy arm" and informed Voronin that 
Kremlin was no longer going to subsidize Moldovan gas supplies and requested repayment of the 
energy debt.301 “The current price of 80 dollars per 10000 cubic meters was well below the 
market value and Russia did not see the need to subsidize Moldovan energy.”302 Kishinev, 
although well aware of the situation, was not able to pay back the debt, which by the way was a 
Transnistrian debt.303 Therefore Kremlin demanded the remining shares in Moldovagaz. Gazprom 
owned 50 percent of Moldovagaz, the only national gas operator in the Republic 35.33% of its 
shares was owned by Moldovan state, and 13.44% by the DMR.304 By taking over the company 
Moscow would eliminate possible transit blockades and would strengthen its energy supplies 
monopoly in Eastern Europe. Moreover at the end of 2005 Moscow announced the doubling of 
the gas price, which meant that in 2006 Moldova would have to pay 160 dollars for 1000 cubic 
meters - the highest sum among all CIS members. Finally, in order to show the seriousness of the 
Russian threat Moscow with the helping hand of  the Transnistrian power station in Ciuciurgan 
suspended the gas supplies to Moldova for a  short period of time.  
Yet, the above-mentioned conflicts were not only the result of the failure of the Kozak 
memorandum and the DMR-Moldova dispute. They were also strictly related to  Moscow’s 
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attempt to influence the outcome of the parliamentary elections in March 2005 and were an 
element of its greater political strategy. As presented earlier in their paper with the failure of the 
Russian proposal of the DMR-Moldova conflict settlement Vladimir Voronin automatically 
became in Moscow persona non grata.  Thus in the forthcoming elections, Russia decided not to 
back the Moldovan Communist Party and instead supported the strongest opposition party. This 
decision surprised, to say the least, both the Moldovan and Russian politicians as the main 
opposition party, Democratic Moldova, was known to be dominated by nationalists with a strong 
anti-Russian stance. Moreover, the leaders of the opposition, Serafin Urekian, Nikolai Andronik 
and Dimitri Bragish, were so far presented mostly in the Russian press as lawbreakers involved in 
smuggling and other criminal activities. 305 Yet, regardless the Russian support for the opposition 
KPM again won the parliamentary elections by taking 46% of the votes. Although this was not 
enough to be able to elect the new president on their own, the number of seats allowed the 
Communists to be able to easily form a coalition for the Presidential voting.306 The Democratic 
Moldova party (which due to the Moscow support suddenly started to be perceived as pro- 
Russian and anti-European) won only 28% of the votes and in fact did not have any real impact 
on law-making procedures in the Moldovan parliament.307 
It is also worth noting that the day before the elections the Moldovan authorities, aware of 
the Russian attempts to affect the ballot, forbade around 100 Russian observers to enter the 
country.308 Additionally, on the day of  the elections several persons of Russian descent were 
arrested and charged with spying. Consequently, the opposition backed  by the Kremlin claimed 
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the election fraud but International observers headed by OSCE representatives announced that the 
elections broadly met the democratic standards.309 This failure of the Russian meddling was 
confirmed couple of weeks later when Communist Party formed a coalition with the pro-
Romanian Christian Democrats and easily elected Vladimir Voronin for his second term. Now the 
only question remained: Would the Moldovan leader continued his pro-European policy or will 
see the reconciliation Russian partners? 
 
  7. East or West? Which Course to Choose? 
 
Right after the end of the negotiations on the “Kozak Memorandum” the answer was 
simple: Voronin administration had made European Union integration its foreign policy priority. 
This is not surprising, taking under consideration that with an upset Russia, strongly supporting 
Smirnof and applying economic sanctions, Western partners were the only choice Voronin 
actually had. The European Union welcomed the new pro-European stance and automatically 
became more involved in the situation in Moldova. Thus, at the beginning of 2005 Brussels 
initiated the signing of the EU Action Plan on Moldova, which contained the practical guidance 
for the development of EU-Moldova relations and determined the steps Kishinev had to take in 
order to enable the future accession.
310
 The Republic also signed the agreement of European 
Neighborhood Policy which, among other things, designated the EU to become a co-mediator in 
the Tiraspol-Kishinev negotiations. Since the change of course in Moldovan foreign policy,  
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Kishinev started also to closely cooperate with the USA. As a result, the U.S. representatives 
joined the five-sided talks on a resolution to the conflict, which now adopted the new form - 
”5+2”, with the two Western participants becoming official observers.311 In this new format the 
sides met three times but without any significant progress, the negotiations were suspended. Yet 
Voronin kept on developing friendly relations with the West, which was confirmed by the 
European Commission opening of an office in Kishinev, appointing Adriaan Jacobovits de 
Szeged as its head and finally devoting 9 million dollars for fighting the economic consequences 
caused by the Russian embargo. Simultaneously, on 19 May 2006 Moldovan authorities agreed 
to sign the “Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO”, showing their strong willingness to 
join the Western military alliance. At the same time the U.S. leaders declared that they were 
ready to take a part in the demilitarization of Transnistria. The warm-up of  Moldovan relations 
with the West clearly indicated a shift in Kishinev’s foreign policy. As Kaljurand puts it, “this 
was a clear message to Russia that Moldova had lost confidence in Russia and had taken 
determined steps towards Europe.”312 
The new orientation towards European integration was visible also in  domestic affairs. At 
the end of 2005 the Moldovan parliament voted to request a total withdrawal of the Russian 
peacekeeping forces and  ammunitions supplying them from DMR by  December of 2006. 313 
The decision was backed up by the leaders in Washington who stated that if Russia would not 
withdraw its troops, the USA would not ratify an agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) while GUAM stated officially that  separatism in Eurasia had been aroused mostly by 
Russian manipulation.314 This just made Moscow’s hackles rise. The Kremlin not only stated that 
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it did not need to enter the CFE, but also the Foreign Policy Minister announced that the Russian 
army should stay in Transnistria even after the end of the conflict in the region.315 Further on 
March 2006 Moscow recalled its Ambassador in Kishinev for consultations. Even the later 
announcement by Vladimir Lupu, the speaker of Moldovan parliament, that Moldova would 
consider exiting the CIS, did not change the Russian’s hard stance on the policy toward the 
weaker partner and therefore Voronin was forced to reconsider his attitude toward Kremlin.  
Indeed, the Communist leaders did their best to avoid the announced increase of gas 
prices. Throughout the entire year 2006 Moldova negotiated with Russia and its President kept on 
traveling to Moscow for the closed-door talks.316 Allegedly the Moldovans offered the Kremlin 
great opportunities for the investment in the country, including taking part in the privatization 
process and purchase of the shares in Moldovagaz. The content of the negotiations was not 
released to the public, which understandably alarmed Moldovan public opinion. The rumors had 
it that Voronin had agreed to cede the Transnistrian shares in the gas operator but this was quickly 
denied by the Minister of Economy Valeriu Lazar.317 The talks on the gas prices lasted up until 
the end of the 2006 year when in December, finally, the sides reached the agreement which 
indicated that the gas price would be increased gradually from 160$ per 1000 cubic mater to 300 
dollars in 2011.318 This agreement was considered a great victory  for the Russian diplomacy. 
Moscow not only was going to received the demanded price for the energy supplies, but most of 
all it seemed as if it had succeeded in turning back Moldova from its pro-European course. This 
should not be considered a surprise. The increasingly weak Communist Party of Moldova did not 
have a choice but to reconsider the Western orientation and to find the way to somehow settle the 
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recent conflict with Russia and thus regain the support on the domestic scene. Moreover, 
Moldova’s location  on the geopolitical map and lack of the alternatives in the energy dispute left 
the authorities in Kishinev without much of a choice. Not without fault was the European Union. 
Throughout the entire 2004-2006 periods Europe seemed not to notice the upcoming energy crisis 
and focused on subsidizing the Moldovan agriculture sector, which was obviously much easier 
than for example subsidizing the energy supplies. It might had seemed that the European 
member-states were hesitant whether to fully involve themselves in Moldovan affairs and as a 
result expose themselves to Russian political anger.319 In this case Kishinev was actually left out 
by its Western partners and therefore forced to look for a settlement with Gazprom.  
 
8. Pleasing Russia 
 
 
Indeed, the beginning of 2007 clearly showed that Moldova had forgotten about its 
European ambitions. The Moldovan government officially announced that as a consequence of 
the Russian-Moldovan settlement on energy supplies, Voronin had agreed for Gazprom to take 
over the Transnistrian shares in Moldovagaz, two thermal-electric power stations, and control 
over power lines exporting electricity to the Balkan states.320 Thereby Moscow received 63,4% of 
stocks in the biggest national gas operator in Moldova and was able to control the distribution 
network and the transit lines that embodied one of the major goals of  Putin’s new energy 
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strategy. 321 Additionally, in order to take full control over the Moldovan power system RAO, one 
of the largest Russian energy operators purchased the power plant “Jes” that was located on the 
Transnistrian territory. 322 
Apart from the negotiations regarding energy prices the Moldovan President conducted 
closed-door talks with Putin’s administration concerning a new proposal for conflict resolution in 
Moldova. The news about the secret talks was first released by the well known political annalist 
of the Eastern Europe, Vladimir Socor in the webpage of the Jamestown Foundation. Namely, 
Socor claimed in the article that Voronin was ready for significant concessions that were 
unacceptable to any of the Western partners.323 This report earned the wrath of Moldovan public 
opinion. In response, 18 publicists, journalists, diplomats and politicians published an open letter 
calling President Voronin to reveal the outcome of the negotiations.324 Despite early assurances 
that such a meeting did not take place, the Presidential administration in April 2007 admitted that 
similar two-sided negotiations had commenced (during the talks Tiraspol was represented by 
Russian mediators). Among other decisions, the  Moldovan chef of state allegedly agreed on the 
permanent presence of the Russian peacekeeping forces and the neutrality of the country, which, 
if applied, would once and for all prevent Kishinev from entering NATO.  
The fact that that the Russian-Moldovan negotiations had actually taken place seemed to 
be confirmed by the subsequent political decisions taken by both sides. For instance, Kishinev’s 
representatives refused to take part in the two GUAM summits, meetings of the organization that 
was perceived as the counterbalance to CIS. Further more, Moldovan authorities rewrote the 
proposal of the National Security Concept in 2007, removed all the articles that could upset 
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Moscow and thus proved that “the security policy had been adjusted to Russia’s wishes.”325 This 
gesture was in turn appreciated by  the Kremlin and Moscow slowly started to lift the economic 
blockade. Firstly in April 2007 the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry along with 
Federal Office of the Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection allowed Moldovan fruits and 
vegetables to return to the Russian market. 326 However the winemaking enterprises patiently 
waited for the lifting of the wine embargo that was promised to happen already at the beginning 
of the year after the open threat that Kishinev would  block Russia’s planned entry to the World 
Trade Organization. The hard stance can be explained by the fact that the loses of the 
winemaking industry were overwhelming and hit the heart of the Moldovan economy. Radio Free 
Europe informed that “the Moldova-Vin export agency estimated the loss in sales for the wine 
industry at over $180 million between March 2006 and January 2007… while Moldova's wine 
production dropped dramatically -8.96 dekaliters of bottled wine in 2006, a 63-percent decrease 
from 2005.”327 Only in June 2007 did Voronin publically announced that the Kremlin had lifted 
the ban but even so only 20 out of 179 plants had authorization for exporting their products to the 
Russian Federation. 328 
The entire year 2008 was marked by the warm-up in Russian-Moldovan relations, 
especially regarding the settlement of the “frozen conflict”. Voronin stated that during the CIS 
summit on February 29, 2008 Putin promised to reassume the “5+2” negotiations and 
furthermore that  Russia had tentatively agreed to replace its troops in the DMR with civilian 
                                                 
325Igor Botan,  Sankt-Petersburg CIS Summit, Democracy.md, accessed online June 11, 2012, http://www.e-
democracy.md/en/monitoring/politics/comments/200806151/ 
326 Lech Wojciechowski, “Mołdawia” in: Rocznik Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 2007 (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2008)248 
327 Ryan Kennedy, Moldova: Counting Losses As Russian Wine Ban Lingers, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
accessed online 20 August 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075697.html 
328B.a.,  Moldovan Wine Back in Russia after Ban, Reuters, accessed online 12 June 2012, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/11/01/uk-moldova-russia-wine-idUKL0142079420071101    
  94 
missions of international observers. 329In order to commence the talks Moscow had to first 
convince Smirnof to sit at the table with USA, UE and Voronin himself. According to 
Kommiersant’s report, Putin’s administration de facto forced DMR leaders to meet with Heikki 
Talvetie, the Special Representative of the head of OSCE, during which Smirnof eventually 
agreed to negotiate with other co-mediators, at the same time signalizing, however that DMR 
would not give up its usual conditions.330 Even more important for Moldova was the statement of 
Russian Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin who assured that Russia would never use the so called 
“Kosovo procedure”, which meant it would never recognize the Transnistrian independence. The 
Chairman of the Commission for CIS Co-operation later confirmed those assurances during his 
visits to Kishinev and Tiraspol where he tried to push DMR authorities to find the way to settle 
things with Voronin. 331 Ostrovski mentioned at the same time that in order to maintain good 
relations with Moscow Voronin should reconsider Moldova’s membership in GUAM.  
Russian-Moldovan co-operation was developing ideally. The closest associates of 
Moldovan President, Marka Tkaczuka, Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sovy, and Dmitri 
Socolana paid couple of visits to Russian officials to discuss the details of the settlement 
proposal. Additionally, Voronin during his meeting with Moscovite Patriarch Aleksei II talked 
about the ”common future of both counties” and their “eternal friendship”. 332 One could easily 
assume that Voronin had returned to a Pro-Russian orientation with a relief. Indeed, some 
Moldovan politicians argued that the Moldovan President’s heart always belonged to Moscow 
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and his abandonment of pro-European course was a sign of common sense and was consistent 
with the country’s political position. 333 His warm feelings toward Moscow had translated to the 
favorable treatment in negotiating the country’s energy debt and prices. When Moldovan Vice-
Minister Zinaida Greciani arrived at the Kremlin to discuss this question, Russia announced the 
possibility of reconsidering its energy prices strategy. Although one could argue that this cannot 
be called a successful negotiation, but taking under consideration the size of debt that amounted 
for 1,8 mil dollars, any concession on that matter could be called a victory. 334  But as always the 
Kremlin’s promises had their own price. Pursuant to Russia’s will Voronin did not attend GUAM 
summit in Batumi on July 1, 2008 and instead sent the country's deputy minister of foreign affairs 
and European integration, Valeriu Ostalep.335 
 
 
            9. Elections crisis. Moldovan Communists lose power 
 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party’s efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow were also 
dictated by the wider political strategy of the party whose major goal was to win the upcoming 
parliamentary elections in 2009. Indeed, as shown earlier, the Russian support has always been an 
important factor in Moldovan elections. By pursuing  the pro-Russian policies and thus finally 
settling the long-lasting conflict in the region Voronin and his party would have had the election 
victory sewn up.  Russia on the other hand, by supporting Communist Party could pursue its own 
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foreign policy, which translated into maintaining dominance in the region and preventing the 
Western players from becoming involved. That is why on February 24, 2009 the Russian Foreign 
Minister came to Kishinev to emphasize Moscow’s support for Communist Party and its leader.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Lavrov used also the opportunity of pre-election tensions and tried to encourage Kishinev to 
eliminate the UE and USA from the negotiations and focus on a tri-lateral settlement. 336 
Furthermore, in order to boost Voronin’s chances Russia offered 500 million dollars per month 
before the July elections.337 Modlova did not take up the offer of the loan but instead agreed on 
conducting three-sided negotiations, Kishinev-Tiraspol-Moscow without the presence of Western 
co-mediators. Moreover, on March 18, 2009 during the meeting of Medvedev with Smirnof and 
Voronin, the latter eventually accepted the current format of the peacekeeping mission in 
Transnistira, resigning from the previous plan to replace Russian troops with an international 
civilian mission. 338  
However, this effort to please Russia and most of all Russian and pro-Russian voters did 
not bring the expected results during the parliamentary elections on 5 April 2009. As a result of 
the elections the Communist Party won the majority of the seats, 60 out of 101, but was not able 
to elect a new president, as the new president , which required a three-fifths of parliamentary 
majority. Because none of the opposition representatives wanted to vote in favor of the 
Communists candidate, Zinaida Greciani, Voronin was forced to dissolve the Parliament and set 
early elections for July 29, the same year. 339 Russian authorities wanting to assure that this time 
PCRM will win the required  61 seats, once again expressed their support for Voronin’s party and 
                                                 
336B.a.,  Moskwa aktywizuje Wysiłki w Mołdawii, OSW, accessed online 30 August 2012, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-02-25/moskwa-aktywizuje-wysilki-w-moldawii 
337 Crandall, Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations…, p.8. 
338 Witold Rodkiewicz, Kreml przejmuje inicjatywę w sprawie Naddniestrza, accessed online 12 September 2012, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-03-25/kreml-przejmuje-inicjatywe-w-sprawie-
naddniestrza 
339 B.a., New Poll in Prospect for Moldova, BBC News, accessed online 23 August 2012, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8080886.stm 
  97 
repeated its loan offer. This did not help out the Communists in the July elections. This time they 
won 12 seats less than the last time, that were transferred to the opposition coalition, Alliance for 
European Integration (AEI). As a result it was the opposition parties oriented to the West that 
won with a slender majority.340 On top of that in September 2009 Voronin resigned after 8 years 
in the office and passed the role of acting President to the current speaker of parliament, Liberal 
Party leader Mihai Ghimpu, until a new presidential election could be held in parliament. 341 
Unfortunately this move “ended in a stalemate.”342 The Parliament was not able to select a new 
President for almost three years during which the country was plunged into the serious political 
crisis.  
The results of the July election took Russian leaders by surprise. The victory of the 
European oriented parties striving for reconciliation with Romania was a real threat to Russian 
dominance in the region. Andrei Makarychev of the Nizhny Novogrod Civil Service Academy 
claimed that “the defeat of the Communist Party of Moldova in the repeat parliamentary election 
of 2009 and the resignation of President Vladimir Voronin have deeply challenged Russia’s 
position in this geographically small, yet politically very important, country… and made Moscow 
reshape its policies toward Chisinau.”343 Indeed, in the aftermath of the announcement of the 
election results, the most important Kremlin leaders, President Medvedev, Minister Lavrov and 
Russian Minister of Finance Aleksei Kudrin rushed to Kishinev under the veil of  an upcoming 
CIS summit in the capital. To the surprise of all Medvedev met with Marian Lubu, the AEI 
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Presidential candidate and officially invited him for the CIS meeting. By doing so Moscow 
showed that its priority was to maintain a strong influence in the country no matter ruled it, 
Communists or Nationalists. At the same time the Kremlin’s diplomacy underlined that the new 
Moldovan leadership could not count on Russia changing its mind on the presence of Russian 
troops and would be grateful if the AEI accepted the “Kozak Memorandum” from 2003. 344  They 
mentioned Kozak’s proposal on purpose. Their main goal was to show dissatisfaction with the 
election’s outcome and that in such  new circumstances Russia was not going to continue the 
policy of concessions. Aside of  from  traditional foreign policy instruments like blackmail, 
Moscow introduced also a new “soft power approach” aimed at strengthening the Russian- 
element in the country. Russia decided to get what it wanted by using persuasion rather than 
coercion, for instance, by economic assistance and cultural exchanges.345 Thereby Moscow 
financed pro-Russia movements like “ Novaia Moldova” of “Russia’s Friend” as well as repeated 
its pre-election loan offer.  
At first the Russian approach worked perfectly. The Western- oriented government agreed 
on February 2010 to extend the existing agreement on the energy supplies with the Power plant in 
Transnistria owned by Russian concern Inter RAO JES.346 Thereby the new leadership showed 
that it was going to continue the energy policy commenced by Voronin and allowed Moscow to 
maintain full control over Moldova’s energy sector. Yet the impasse in the Russian-Moldovan 
relations began again two months latter. The crisis was caused by the acting President Mihai 
Ghimpu, decision, not to attend the celebrations of the 65th anniversary of the victory in II World 
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War in Moscow. 347 This decision was strictly related with the upcoming parliamentary elections 
and revealed the real ambitions of some of the pro-Western politicians. In face of this political 
statement on the part of the coalition in power and the elections in November the same year 
Russia decided to confound the pro-Western AEI and thus again back the Moldovan Communists. 
In order to do so on July 19, 2010 the Chief of the Sanitary Inspection Giennadi Onishchenko 
announced the reintroduction of a ban on  Moldovan wine. Furthermore, as in 2005, the embargo 
was followed by a ban on fruits and vegetables. Those political actions did not bring the expected 
result though. In the fourth-parliamentary election in two years  the governing coalition gained 59 
seats, while  the PCRM received only 42 mandates.348  Moreover, the government remained 
almost the same and an the no longer favored by Moscow Vlad Filat was reappointed a Prime 
Minister.349  
The entire decade of the Russian-Moldovan relations was therefore marked alternately by 
the successes and failures of Russian diplomacy in maintaining dominance in Moldova. When in 
2001 the Communist Party headed by Vladimir Voronin came to power one would assume that 
having things in hand would be an easy task for Kremlin. Yet it seemed that Russia overestimated 
Voronin’s pro-Russian stance, ignoring his European aspirations and political consciousness. 
However, it proved later that the hard power instruments toward Kishinev worked very well and 
the Moldovan government returned to a pro-Russian course. Not without unpleasant 
consequences , however. The constant political and economic sabotage and dual strategy toward 
Western players resulted in Russia’s lost of credibility in the eyes of the Moldovan society and 
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the international community. Nevertheless, during the ten years Kremlin managed to achieve 
some of  Putin’s foreign policy goals. It took almost full control over the Moldovan energy sector 
and was able to maintain strong influence in Transnistira. Moldova, on the other hand, turned out 
to be less successful in pursuing its objectives. It had lost on every front, beginning with 
European integration.  
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Conclusion 
 
1. Current Situation in Brief 
 
 
The Russians’ striving over maintaining strong influence on political life in the Republic 
of Moldova has continued. The areas in which the Russian authorities have been using their tools 
in order to pursue Moscow’s interests also remained unchanged: the issues of Transnistria, energy 
supplies and trade regulations. The last 20 years of Moldova- Russian relations prove that 
whenever, as during the early elections organized due to the Parliament’s incapability to select a 
President, the pro-Russian camp was loosing mandates, Moscow, instead of strengthening its 
position by using soft power, decided more often to use  political and economic sabotage in order 
to keep the region within Russian sphere of influence. The resolution of Transnistria conflict and 
the presence of the Russian peacekeeping mission are the main issues of Moldova-Russia 
relations recently. For instance, when the pro-European coalition won the parliamentary elections 
in Moldova at the end of November 2010 the Kremlin refused to continue the negotiations over 
the DMR issue in order to show that the Russians believed that only the Communist Party would 
be capable of carrying out the talks. But only recently has it turned out that the Western oriented 
parties have not been the only factor that have been disturbing Russian domination in the country. 
DMR leaders began to formulate their own independent policy toward the government in 
Kishinev, not necessarily synchronized with the one performed by Moscow.  Since the last thing 
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Smirnof wanted the reunion of the breakaway region with the rest of the Republic (which was the 
main goal of the Russia-initiated negotiations), the lack of understanding between AEI and Putin 
well corresponded with his interests. That is why Smirnof openly supported the Moldovan pro-
European government in order to remain the only guarantor of the Russian interest in the region. 
For instance, the invitation of the President of the breakaway region to  Prime Minister Filat to 
jointly attend the international football game in Tiraspol was a clear demonstration of divergence 
between Transnistria’s and Russia’s approach toward the government in Kishinev . 
This, again, set in motion the traditional mechanism of Russian foreign policy towards 
Kishinev. On February 2011 the Russian Ambassador to Moldova, Valeri Kuzmin,  suggested that 
Gazprom could rethink the announced increase in gas prices if Kishinev agreed to accept the 
Russian military presence in the DMR. 350 This offer was not aimed only at stressing that no deal 
could be made behind Moscow’s back but most notably at strengthening the division among the 
pro-European coalition’s parties, between supporters and opponents of intensification of co-
operation with the Kremlin before elections planned for November 2011. Putin’s government also 
did not hesitate to show its dissatisfaction with the political decision of the Democratic Party of 
Moldova, which had chosen to unify with pro-Romanian party headed by Filat instead of forming 
a coalition with Voronin. Therefore, when Lupu arrived in Moscow for an official visit as speaker 
of the Moldovan Parliament none of the Russian newspapers even mentioned his visit while the 
meeting of speaker of DMR Parliament, Anatolii Kaminski, with Russian leaders was widely 
commented in local media. 351 
Meanwhile Tiraspol continued conducting an independent policy toward the Western - 
oriented central government. Smirnof was even able to muster its support for initiating the peace 
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negotiations, without any assistance from Moscow, in exchange for lifting the trade 
restrictions.352 But according to the specialists from the Center of Eastern Studies in Warsaw the 
current offer was just a carrot on the stick that was supposed to enable DMR authorities to gain 
significant economic privileges in exchange  for empty political promises.353 The answer from 
Moscow was a sudden removal of endorsement for Smirnof and an announcement of support for 
the new Presidential candidate of DMR, Anatolii Kaminski. 
The empty promises also characterized the Russian approach towards the Moldovan 
leadership. For example, Moscow invited Kishinev to sign the CIS Free Trade Agreement on 
February 10, 2012. Although theoretically the Free Trade Agreement was supposed to put an end 
to the constant economic sabotage performed by Russia, the document was full of exclusions 
from the Free Trade Zone that included the most important trade products like agriculture 
products, alcohol and, of course, gas. At the same time it’s important to remember that the offer 
to join the Zone was an element of the Russian pre-election campaign in Moldova that was aimed 
at supporting the pro-Russian political element. Finally, on 16 March 2012, after the stalemate 
that had lasted for almost 3 years, AEI managed to nominate a new President, Supreme 
Magistrate Council Chair and Judge Nicolae Timofti, and by doing so it confirmed Moldova’s 
European ambitions.  As usual this did not go without unpleasant consequences for Republic of 
Moldova. Right after the nomination the Russian Minister of Defence Anatolij Sierdiukow and 
the Special Representative for Transnistria Dimitri Rogozin rushed to the breakaway region to 
confirm Russia’s vital economic and political interests in the DMR. Russian officials did not 
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inform the government in Kishinev about the visit which was a clear statement that the Kremlin 
was going to ignore the theoretical integrity of the two entities. Moreover, just recently Moscow 
urged Moldova to quit the EU Energy Cooperation Agreement. On September 12, 2012 the 
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak told reporters “First of all, we propose that Moldova 
denounce the protocol on entering the Europe energy community agreement. This is a 
precondition for us to discuss the issue of gas price cuts and the relief of debt, which at the 
moment amounts to $4.1 billion.”354 
 
 
2. What next? 
 
 
When in 2009 the Alliance for European Integration came to power in Moldova most of 
the observers announced a new era in the relations between governments in Kishinev and 
Moscow. For the first time the Russian influence in Moldova became significantly threatened as 
Kishinev stated its serious interest in the European integration. Taking into consideration Russia's 
geopolitics the election's results started the beginning of  political and economic turmoil in the 
region. Yet, even after the pro-European parties came to power relations did not change much and 
were basically characterized by usual ups and downs. Why? It seemed like none of the Moldovan 
factions could really commit to either the Eastern or Western side, balancing between them 
constantly. Kaljurand went even further, describing the leaders in Kishinev as “corrupt and 
authoritarian playing a rather pragmatic game of perpetual maneuvering between East and West 
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to strengthen their own position.” 355They kept sending contradictory messages to their Russian 
partner and the European Union and that is why the country lost the credibility in the eyes of 
international players. 
 Yet it can be argued that in his conclusions Kaljurand went too far. One cannot forget that 
Moldova's turbulent history as well as its current geopolitical position did not allow Kishinev to 
ignore Moscow. Aside from the obvious energy dependence, Moldova had to struggle with the 
„frozen conflict” on its territory, that was controlled military by the outside  forces. 
Understandably, those two factors were determinative in forming foreign policy toward Russian 
Federation. The small, impoverished and politically unstable country could not resist the 
influences of the  “superpower in the territory of former Soviet Union” that uses its energy 
domination and military presence to sabotage the domestic and foreign politics.356 On top of that 
Moldova deeply depended on the export of agriculture products to Russia with its wine industry 
estimated to account for somewhere near 25 percent of Moldova's gross domestic product (GDP), 
with 80 percent of that wine exported to Russia. 357 Therefore, at least for now, with no strong 
support from the West the hands of the Moldovan leaders are tied and they have to adjust their 
political decision with an eye on the Kremlin.   
Russia, on the other hand, was simply pursuing its own numerous interests in the region. 
The first was to maintain the historical ties with the region inherited from Russian Empire and 
Soviet Union, which included the economic resources and the population of Russian desent. 
However, it is important to notice the fact that Russian actions had nothing to do with neo-
imperialist ambition or expansionism. The leaders in Moscow  want to ensure that Moldova will 
stay within the Russian sphere of influence and thwart the danger of closer  relations between 
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Moldova Western organizations like NATO or EU. That is why that the political and economic 
leverage will probably remained the major tool in Russian foreign policy toward Moldova.  
Is it possible to break the impasse in the Russian-Moldovan relations? The only answer 
would be the intensified involvement of Western players, especially the European Union. Taking 
under consideration Kishinev’s current efforts to come closer to European integration, EU 
engagement in the region is the only way to balance Russian influence. However, this would 
require the European states to engage strongly in the region, especially in the settling the 
Transnistrian conflict. But even more importantly this would require  the EU to formulate a new 
strategy toward the region that would be linked more with Russian policy toward the “shared 
neighborhood”. For now the lack of communication between Brussels and Moscow results in 
causing political crisis in the region that is sandwiched between two regional centers. 
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